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# THE SOUTHWESTERN SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

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## A DECADE OF STATE SPENDING IN ARKANSAS

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Expenditures of state revenues in Arkansas from 1924 to 1936 increased from \$10,938,000 to \$22,285,000, or about 104 per cent. The equivalent expenditure in 1936, in terms of purchasing power, represented 147 per cent increase over the 1924 basis. With the new taxes going into effect this year and the appropriations made by the General Assembly, revenues and expenditures by 1938, assuming that the volume of business in the state will continue at the present level, will possibly rise above the 1936 amounts by 5 million dollars.

The increase in state expenditures is explained by the inauguration of new services, the enlargement of some of the older services, and the state's taking over a part of the financial burden of counties and local divisions.

State expenditures for highways in the 12-year period increased from about 3.6 million dollars to 10.9 million, or about 200 per cent; for fiscal administration, from less than \$400,000 to more than a million, or 164 per cent; for general and miscellaneous departments, from \$261,000 to \$542,000, or 108 per cent; and for education, from \$3,412,000 to \$5,584,000, or about 64 per cent. Charity, welfare, pensions, and public health during the period increased at about the same rate as public education.

Expenditures for only two of the major functions of government were reduced during the 12-year period. Legislation cost the state 28 per cent less in 1936 than in 1924, and penal and reform institutions cost 44 per cent less. While the educational group as a whole was benefitted by larger budgets

from the state, the major increase in the divisions of public education was for the common schools, about 86 per cent. Budgets for higher educational institutions rose only 7 per cent. Agencies or services created after 1924, expenditures for which account for some of the increase in budget, are the following: Lieutenant Governor, timber inspection, Public Utilities Department, State Police Department, Racing Commission, Basic Science Board, Agricultural Credit Board, State Park Commission, State Planning Board, Forestry Commission, Henderson State Teachers College, the three Vocational Schools at Beebe, Clinton, and Huntsville, the Branch Agricultural Experiment Stations, Children's Home and Hospital, Crippled Children's Commission, McRae Sanatorium, Welfare Department, and pensions for the indigent blind and aged. Total state expenditures in 1936 for all of these new agencies and services combined amounted to \$1,211,000, which accounts for only about 11 per cent of the increase of total expenditures. The 93 per cent difference between this 11 per cent and the total increase of 104 per cent was for enlargement of services available in 1924. Of the total increase for all purposes, highways took about 67 per cent, common schools about 19 per cent, and all other agencies, institutions, and services combined about 7 per cent.

State tax collections have, of course, been consistent with expenditures, increasing from \$11,026,000 in 1924 to \$22,392,000 in 1936, or 103 per cent. State tax collections from most of the sources already established in 1924 declined during the 12-year period. The state's portion of the general property tax declined about 19 per cent, the inheritance tax about 72 per cent, and the severance tax 57 per cent. License tax collections, a part of which was the automobile license, increased 33 per cent, and taxes on insurance premiums increased 17 per cent.

The increase in tax revenues is mainly from sales taxes, including those on gasoline, tobacco, malt, liquor, beer, wine, and retail sales, all of which, excepting the gasoline tax, have been put into effect since 1924. The total increase in revenues from this group has been from \$1,808,000 to \$13,435,000, or 643 per cent. In fact, the amount of revenues obtained from the sales tax group in 1936 exceeded the total of all state revenues collected in 1924.



These data on state revenues and expenditures were compiled, mainly, from the records of the State Comptroller's office.

There is nothing unusual in the upward trend in state expenditures and taxation during the last 12 years, nor in the prospective increase during the present biennium. In the prior 12-year period, state revenues increased from \$2,935,000 in 1912 to \$11,026,000 in 1924, or 276 per cent. In the last biennium of that period the change was from \$6,251,000 to \$11,026,000, or an increase in two years of 76 per cent.

The explanation of these developments is simple enough. First, the normal growth of population and business in the state would require at least a corresponding increase in the cost of government. Second, the state government, from time to time, has assumed certain financial requirements of the local divisions. Since 1924 the state has collected all the severance tax and has turned back one-third of it to the counties for roads and schools, and in most years since 1923 a part of gasoline tax revenues has been given to the counties for roads. In 1927 the state assumed the bonded debt of local road improvement districts. Owing to the decline in the assessed valuation of property, and for other reasons, the state government, during the 12-year period, has levied a number of new taxes to supplement local school revenues. Third, there is a constant demand for improving the standards of worthwhile public services, of which roads and schools are good examples, which also leads to increased cost. Fourth, the historical tendency is for people generally to satisfy an increasing number of their wants by means of public rather than private expenditures. This means, literally, that taxpayers as a group are willing to give an increasing proportion of their incomes for public spending. These developments, all of which seem desirable, account for what may appear to be an abnormal rise in the cost of state government.

Another consideration is the fact that the public generally expresses its demand in piecemeal fashion. That is, new services or improvements in older services are approved one at a time over a period of years, and any one of such services may represent only a nominal increase in the cost of government. If the groups interested in public services should be in a position to view all the demands at the same time, which in practice they never do, the additions which are constantly

being made might be viewed more conservatively. Because of the piecemeal fashion in which public expenditures are approved, organized minorities are able to obtain approval for the things of interest to them.

The problem in state and local finance is not in the consistent upward trend of expenditures and taxation as such. These are merely evidences of the disposition of people generally to rely on the government for certain services which they formerly provided at private expense, or did without, and of the disposition to tax themselves accordingly. If it is true that people generally can satisfy certain of their wants better or more economically by means of public spending, or if they think they can, public expenditures and taxation will continue upward at whatever rate the demand requires. The only ultimate limit of taxation, which, however, it is unbelievable to think would ever be reached, is the total volume of income of all the people. With taxpayers, as a majority, it is a question of what proportion of private incomes will be used for public services, or, on the other hand, what proportion will be retained by the individual and used for private spending.

The problem, aside from the need for constant vigilance in maintaining an equitable taxing system, is in obtaining the maximum benefit, in terms of public services, from the funds expended. It will be the height of folly, in view of the trends already noted, if this problem is not attacked more vigorously and more comprehensively. It is encouraging, on the other hand, to observe some evidence of an awakening in this regard.

During the 12-year period in review, several steps in the right direction have been taken. The audit system has been expanded to the point of reasonably safeguarding public funds from misappropriation, and the recently inaugurated pre-audit system tends to maintain standard prices for standard goods and services purchased. The budget law prevents spending amounts in excess of legislative appropriations. The state purchasing department provides a means of obtaining goods for certain state institutions at wholesale prices. The Civil Service law is a step in the direction of standardizing the qualifications and salaries of state employees. The higher educational institutions and some of the others which have

been consistently under good management for a period of years have, on their own account, devised institutional regulations for public spending, with the result that all expenditures are carefully supervised, wages and other personal services are standardized, commonly below commercial rates, and equipment and supplies are approved for purchase only when they are the most suitable and economical for the use intended.

While these are important steps in the right direction, the state needs to go much further in safeguarding and making more efficient public expenditures not only of state agencies but also of county and local spending agencies. The state should follow its subsidies to the counties and local divisions with regulations requiring efficiency in spending. One example is the highway turnback fund, the expenditure of which should be conditioned on state-approved engineering specifications. The use of subsidies for the public schools, particularly those derived from special sources, should be conditioned on a reasonable effort on the part of the local district not only to tax themselves but to organize the local school into an efficient unit. Moreover, all local bond issues should be supervised and approved by the state. The emphasis in this regard should be as much in the direction of increasing the volume and quality of public services as in saving tax money.

Concurrently with an attack on the spending process should be initiated a thorough-going evaluation of the taxing system, both for eliminating unnecessary cost and for removing obvious inequalities. New taxes, like new expenditures, are adopted one at a time, commonly without due regard to the relation of the new to the old. An individual tax may be inequitable because of loopholes in the law permitting evasion or because of laxity in administration. The whole taxing system may become inequitable because groups of different tax measures may tend to pyramid the tax burden on certain groups of the population.

The business of state and local finance has become too large for the state to neglect any means of safeguarding the taxpayer and the services derived from tax moneys.

## THE 1937 SOIL CONSERVATION PROGRAM IN DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS

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The following study has been made of Denton County, Texas, not with the idea that this county, containing only about 1 per cent of the total harvested lands of Texas according to the census of 1935, and only 0.76 per cent of the state acreage in cotton—the chief crop of both county and state—could in any way be considered a representative sample of the state. In a state of such vast area and such variable conditions, such a claim would be absurd. The study was undertaken, however, with the belief that there might be secured from the work sheets of farmers cooperating in the soil conservation program and the tabulations made by officials administering that program much valuable material from which could be deduced certain pertinent facts in regard to the relative size of farm holdings operated by owners and tenants; the proportion of rented farms of which the landlords are banks, insurance companies, or other corporations; the proportion of owners and tenants who, having once undertaken to cooperate with the agricultural conservation program, fail to carry the program through the season; and, most especially, the average financial reward for cooperation, the basis for its determination, and the relative amounts going to land owner and to tenant.

All of the foregoing information can be secured from the records of operation for a single year. It is believed that the study of records of successive years may well answer various additional questions as to the effect of the program on the mobility of tenants, upon diversification, and upon the possible replacement of tenants by acreage reduction. It would be interesting, particularly in the South, if it were possible to derive directly from these records information as to the degree of participation in the program and financial returns therefrom of the Negro as compared with the white farmer. These facts, however, are not shown by the present records.

Unfortunately the work sheets and records give information only in regard to the total crop acreage and acreage in various crops of farmers who have participated in the

program. These have been used for the latest available year, 1936. There is no equivalent information for the non-participating farmers to be used as a basis of comparison. The agricultural census gives much information from which general comparisons may be drawn for the county as a whole.

The acreage of crop land included in participating farms approximated 50 per cent of the total crop land in the county in 1935 and nearly 60 per cent of the total harvested land. Numbers assigned to participating farmers covered a series totaling 1363 numbers. Of these, 1217 completed the program. Of the remaining 146 numbers, 138 are known to have been assigned to farmers who dropped out, but not until after definite information had been secured as to whether they were owners or tenants. The remaining eight are unaccounted for and represent either persons who failed even to make out work sheets, and so hardly started to participate, or those who were not assigned numbers. For the purpose of this study these eight will be ignored. The study includes only the 1217 who completed the program and the 138 known to have discontinued.

Owner operators totaled 566, or 46.5 per cent of the 1214 who completed the program; and tenant operators 651, or 53.5 per cent. The owner operators cultivated 70,918.9 acres, or 46.8 per cent, of the cooperating acreage; and tenants, 80,630.8 acres, the remaining 53.2 per cent. Of participating cotton acreage, owners held 16,151.7 acres, or 43.4 per cent; and tenants, 21,103.5 acres, or 56.6 per cent. Together their cotton acreage was equivalent to 48.6 per cent of the total county acreage in cotton in 1935. It will be seen that the average crop land of the participating farm was 124.5 acres. This figure is considerably more than the 92.2 acres of land available for crops in the average Denton County farm, and still more than the 79.5 acres of land per farm which in 1935 might strictly be called crop land, a term used by the census to include land not only harvested but also "failure, idle or fallow," not, however, pasture and woodland. It is with these 79.5 acres that the crop land acreage of the participating farm is more logically to be compared. The average amount of crop land of the participating farm-owner operator was 125.3 acres; of the tenant operator, 123.8 acres.



A COMPARISON OF THE DISTRIBUTION, ACCORDING TO CROPS,  
OF LAND IN DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS, IN 1930 AND 1935  
WITH LAND PARTICIPATING IN THE CONSERVATION  
PROGRAM IN SAME COUNTY IN 1936\*

	Total 1930 Acreage**	Total 1935 Acreage**	Conservation Program 1936 Acreage***
Cotton	115,078	76,581	37,255
Wheat	49,983	50,682	19,860
Oats	49,603	61,062	31,960
Corn	40,867	30,576	12,521
Peanuts	8,856	8,219	1,077
Miscellaneous	22,526	27,606	48,877
Total Harvested	286,913	254,726	151,550
Idle, Fallow, or Failure	39,242	47,246	5,588
Total Cropland	326,155	301,972	157,138

\*Denton County farms numbered 3693 in 1930, and 3796 in 1935. Farms completing participation in the 1936 Soil Conservation Program numbered 1217.

\*\*Source: United States Census of Agriculture, 1935, Vol. II, Statistics by Counties.

\*\*\*Source: Records in County Agent's Office, Denton County, Texas.

The proportion of owners with very small acreage who participated in the program was larger than that of tenants. For both groups the model farm was between fifty and one hundred acres. Tenant farmers operated nearly as large a percentage of the farms between one hundred and one hundred and fifty acres as between fifty and one hundred acres. On the other hand, the proportion of owner operators in this group was somewhat lower. Again, the percentage of participating farm owners who operated farms of more than 200 acres was slightly higher than that of tenants, and the proportional acreage in owner-operated farms of large size was greater than in tenant-operated farms. The farms of the owner operators ran to slightly greater extremes of both large and small size. Fifty-one per cent of their farms were in the groups of from 50-150 acres; 61 per cent of the tenant-operated farms were in this group. The sample is much too small, however, to draw any conclusions as to relative range in size.

It is perhaps of some interest to look briefly at the 138 farmers who started to participate in the program and are

known to have dropped it. Of these, 86 were tenants and 52 were owners. In other words, 9.2 per cent of the owners and 11.7 per cent of the tenants who undertook the program did not complete it. No figures were available for the acreage of farms which dropped; therefore, it is not possible to know whether there exists any discernible correlation between size of farm and survival in the program. One factor which may have influenced these percentages is the possibility that in some cases farmers signed up with the program as a form of crop insurance. If any catastrophe hit their crop, they could claim reduction on the damaged acreage by plowing under the crop. If the season proved favorable, they might have no intention of carrying out the program since no loss other than failure to receive benefits was involved.

It was possible to gather from the records a little information as to the prevalence of farm ownership by banks, insurance companies, and other corporations of tenant-operated farms.<sup>1</sup> The total number of farms of this type was 210, or 28.5 per cent of the 737 tenants who entered upon the program.<sup>2</sup> Of these 210, thirty-four, or 16.2 per cent, did not complete the program. It would be interesting to know what influence, if any, landlordism of this type had on success in the program. It was the opinion of persons in the county agent's office that corporation landlords were likely to encourage participation. Again it is unfortunate that no figures are available to show what proportion of tenant-operated farms of this type did not undertake the program at all. Whether the somewhat higher mortality in this group was due to over-persuasion by the landlord in the first place, or is merely accidental in this small sample, is impossible to state.

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<sup>1</sup>Only two participating farms were operated directly by corporation owners, using hired labor rather than tenants. Both of these completed the program.

<sup>2</sup>As stated above, acreage figures were not available for any except those who completed the program. Crop acreage of participating tenant farms with corporation landlords totalled 24,136.8 acres, which was 15.9 per cent of the total acreage in farms which completed the program. A study of selected counties in North Carolina, Georgia, and Mississippi showed that percentage of land of farms held by corporations ranged from 8.5 to 10.9 per cent of the total land in the counties studied. See *Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation*, Division of Social Research, Works Progress Administration, Washington, 1936, p. 198.

Before analyzing the financial returns from cooperation in the soil conservation program, perhaps it might be well first to give an explanation of the bases used in determining payment.<sup>3</sup> Pay was of two classes. Class I, soil-conserving payment, was made for the diversion of land from any soil-depleting base to the production of soil-conserving crops. Class II payment, or soil-building payment, was made for the carrying out of any of a list of practices approved by the Secretary of Agriculture.

For each farm a total soil-depleting base was set up by a county committee elected by the farmers among themselves. This base was determined by the average acreage harvested in 1935, modified, if necessary, when this acreage varied widely from that harvested under normal conditions in past years. For the county as a whole the ratio of such base to all farm land or all crop land was set by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and known as the county limit. In Denton County this total soil-depleting base was made up of land in three uses; namely, (1) in cotton production, for which the 1928-32 average production was considered normal, (2) in the production of peanuts for which the production of 1931-34 was considered normal, and (3) in general crops, consisting of all other crops produced. Payment might be received for diverting up to 35 per cent of the cotton base, up to 20 per cent of the peanut base, and up to 15 per cent of the general crop base. Cotton payments were made according to the productivity of the individual farm at the rate of 5c a pound for lint. There was no limit set for any particular farm, but a prescribed county average set a limit for the whole county. The pay for diversion from peanuts was 1½c a pound; the pay on the general crop base was the county average for Denton County of \$9.30 an acre.

This Class I pay was divided, if the farm were operated by a tenant, in the following way. To the owner of the land went 37½ per cent, to the owner of teams and tools, 12½ per cent. The remaining 50 per cent was divided as the crop was divided. In Denton County the most common rent contract is the "third and fourth" arrangement, by which the

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<sup>3</sup>1936 Agricultural Program, Southern Region. Bulletin No. I. Revised. Sept. 1, 1936.

tenants provide their own stock and the landlord receives as rent one-third of the cotton and one-fourth of the corn.<sup>4</sup>

Diverted acres must be planted to soil-conserving crops. Soil-building acreage is not limited to diverted areas. An allowance of one dollar an acre was allowed for each acre used in 1936 for soil-building uses. It had to be earned to be received. Payment went to the one, either owner or tenant, who had incurred the expense involved in the soil-building practice.

In the analysis of the actual returns from the program in Denton county, the farms operated by owners may be divided into two groups.<sup>5</sup> In much the larger proportion (512 of the 566, or 90 per cent) checks went only to owner operators. That is, no sharecroppers or others received checks from the Adjustment Administration. In most cases these farmers received both Class I and Class II pay, but a small number (5 per cent) undertook the soil-conserving program only, and still fewer (4.5 per cent) received checks only for soil-building practices. The average return per farm in this group was \$164.13. The average Class I payment was \$145.58; and average Class II payment, \$26.86.<sup>6</sup> A small group of farms showed contract arrangements with sharecroppers or others not on the common "third and fourth" rental basis. It is interesting to note that this group showed the highest average total benefit per farm, averaging \$214.90. The owners received much the larger fraction of this, averaging \$177.27 apiece, largely in Class I pay, which averaged \$146.40 per owner. Nearly all owners in this class undertook both parts of the program. The sharecroppers and other recipients of benefits on these farms averaged only \$37.63 per farm, and of this,

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<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 10, 11.

<sup>5</sup>At the time this study was made checks had not been received for twenty-six farms which cooperated in the 1936 program. These were farms operated by tenants and represented 4.6 per cent of the farms of this class. A preliminary tabulation was made when less than one-half of the checks of this class had been received, and the results differed only slightly from the figures given here. It is therefore believed that the absence of this much smaller proportion will not materially affect the conclusions to be drawn.

<sup>6</sup>Nearly all Class II payments were less than fifty dollars in amount. Only three owners using sharecroppers, eleven independent owner operators, and three tenants (operating on "third and fourth" contracts) received in excess of \$100.00 of this type of pay.



\$34.76 was Class I pay. On less than one-fourth of the farms did the sharecroppers receive any benefits for soil-building practices, and for these few the benefits amounted to only \$12.08 per farm.

Where the farm was operated by tenants on a "third and fourth" contract, the owner received slightly more than the tenant of Class I pay, averaging \$76.82 per owner and \$70.53 for the tenant. But only 5.2 per cent of the landlords received Class II pay at all. These were paid an average of \$18.92, but were so few in number that they raised the owner's share only to \$77.80 per farm. The "third and fourth" tenants, however, entered into soil-building practices extensively (95 per cent took part) and received an average of \$26.35 per participant. The average total return per farm in this group amounted to \$173.24, which compared favorably with the \$164.13 received per farm where the farmers were the sole operators, but which was considerably less than the returns made to farms using sharecroppers.

In conclusion, one may make the following summary of the findings. In Denton County the harvested acreage of farms which participated in the soil conservation program of 1936 totalled roughly three-fifths of the acreage harvested in the county according to the Agricultural Census of 1935. Slightly less than half of the participating farms were operated by owners; slightly more than half by tenants. The crop land acreage of participating farms averaged over 50 per cent more than the crop land of the average county farm. The most typical size of participating farms ranged between one hundred and one hundred and fifty acres. Owner operators more frequently than tenants participated on very large or very small farms. Failure to complete the program ran around 10 per cent, being higher for tenants than for owner operators. Tenants with corporation landlords showed a higher failure ratio of 16 per cent.

As reward for cooperation, the highest benefits went to landlords using sharecroppers. The combined returns to landlords and on farms operated on a "third and fourth" contract averaged 20 per cent less; while the farms operated by owners without the use of sharecroppers received the smallest average returns. However the difference between the benefits received by the two last-mentioned groups was not marked. Pay for soil-conserving practices (Class I pay), as distinguished



from pay for soil-building practices (Class II pay), constituted most of the benefits received. The Class II pay was in general rather insignificant in amount.

Altogether, because of the smallness of the sample, the findings are more suggestive as to possible trends than significant in themselves. Similar studies over a larger area might make possible a definite comparison of the merits of this program with those of other programs for farm relief.

## A SURVEY OF FARMERS' COOPERATIVE MARKETING AND PURCHASING ASSOCIATIONS IN MISSOURI\*

HERMAN M. HAAG

*University of Missouri*

When we began the survey of farmers' cooperative business associations in 1935, we had two objectives in mind. First and most important, we wanted information which would describe each cooperative association in our state. The material which we considered necessary for this purpose included (1) date of organization, (2) law under which incorporated, (3) number of members, (4) requirements for membership, (5) number of directors, (6) advantages and weaknesses as seen by the manager, (7) kinds of products and supplies handled and the dollar volume of each supply and product, (8) where products were sold and supplies were bought, (9) methods of transportation used to bring supplies to the store and to ship products out, (10) dollar volume of business for the last ten years or as far back as it was available, (11) credit practices and business policies, and (12) the balance sheet at the end of the latest fiscal year, including a complete description of certain assets and liabilities. A classification of accounts and notes receivable by age and an estimate of their value were obtained whenever possible, as well as the gross value, allowance for depreciation, and net value of each building and group of equipment. Information as to the number of physical units of each product or supply handled was impossible to obtain with any degree of accuracy and was therefore omitted.

The second objective was to obtain data which would indicate factors contributing to the success of small local cooperative associations. For this purpose a profit and loss statement for 1935, the margins taken by the association on each product and supply handled, the experience and training of the manager, and similar information was obtained. Of course, much of the information listed above as descriptive material also was helpful in making a business analysis of local associations.

At the start, we had planned to contact only a sample of the associations in the state, probably not more than one-third of them. We were, however, successful in interesting the Co-

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\*The results of this survey have now been published in detail in Missouri Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 389.

operative Division of the Farm Credit Administration in the project to the extent that they put some men in the state to help collect the information. As a result, practically all of the associations in the state were visited. As was to be expected, a few associations refused to give us the information.

Information as extensive as this had never been obtained in Missouri. A limited amount of information had been obtained by a mail questionnaire in 1926 from about one-third of the associations then in existence. From these returns, Missouri Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 253 was prepared. Since then the Division of Cooperative Marketing of the U. S. D. A., later the Federal Farm Board, and finally the Farm Credit Administration have attempted to provide certain information on cooperative associations in each state. At best, however, this information has been only indicative of the growth in number, membership, and volume of business of farmers' cooperative associations.

It was decided at the outset to limit the survey to purchasing and marketing associations and, furthermore, to exclude petroleum products, except where oils and greases were an integral part of a general purchasing association. It was also decided to confine the study to local associations, inasmuch as information on the larger organizations was currently available anyway.

One of the first problems was that of determining what was to be considered a farmers' cooperative business association. In other words, when is a business enterprise a cooperative and when a private business? It is not possible to distinguish clearly between the two except on an arbitrary basis. In this study four criteria were used in deciding whether or not to include an organization's records. These, in the form of questions, were: (1) Is the amount of capital stock which one man may own limited? (2) Is the dividend on stock limited? (3) Is there a provision for the payment of patronage dividends? and (4) Is the ownership and control of the association principally in the hands of producers or farmers? Ordinarily the answer to each question would be "yes". Several creameries organized under business corporation laws, however, were included because they pooled their cream receipts for each two-week period and paid producers according to the value of butter produced from each pool. In addition, dividends on stock and amount of stock which one

person could hold were limited, although it was not held principally by farmers. On the other hand, some farmers' stock companies, principally elevators, were excluded even though owned entirely by farmers, because dividends and stock ownership were not limited, and patronage dividends were not provided for.

Missouri is extremely fortunate in having a large number of the local associations under the influence of a state organization which provides an auditing service at less than cost. Furthermore, the audit is complete. Consequently, much of the financial information desired for the latest fiscal year was readily available. If an association had an audit for the past fiscal year, the information it contained was first transcribed. The enumerator was then in a much better position to ask the manager the questions of policy, organization, and opinion. In connection with these latter questions, it was difficult to get accurate information where a new manager had been chosen since the end of the fiscal year, especially if he had not been associated with the organization previously. In such cases a helper or the bookkeeper often had to be relied upon. Wherever possible, however, estimates and opinions were obtained only from the manager.

Several questions on the schedule gave considerable trouble. One, in particular, was the number of patrons. Most managers, unless they had maintained the information for purposes of patronage dividends, were very hesitant about estimating the number of patrons. Also, managers generally were not well informed about the voting rights of members.

No doubt results of the survey will be of greater interest than a discussion of methods. There are about 439 farmers' purchasing and marketing associations in Missouri. By types there are approximately 313 local elevators and exchanges, 27 local fruit shipping associations, 54 local livestock shipping associations, 8 local creameries, 8 miscellaneous local associations, and 30 larger associations serving a wider territory. Included in this latter group are milk marketing or bargaining associations, livestock commission companies, grain marketing associations, wholesale purchasing associations, and centrally-located poultry processing and egg packing plants. Because they serve Missouri farmers principally, several cooperative associations located in nearby states are regarded as Missouri

cooperatives in so far as their business is obtained from Missouri.

The total cooperative business in Missouri for 1935 is estimated at more than \$60,000,000. The local associations had a total sales volume in excess of \$31,000,000 and the large-scale centrally-located associations accounted for nearly all the remainder.

Generally speaking it would be difficult to classify the elevators and exchanges in Missouri as either marketing or purchasing associations. Because the sale of feed is common to virtually all of them, this group is best characterized as feed stores with some supplementary business. This additional business may include the handling of any or all of the following: produce, that is, poultry, eggs, cream, wool, and hides; grains; livestock; groceries; farm machinery; paints; gasoline and oils; fencing; seeds; twine; sacks; building materials; fertilizers; and lime. Since audit reports contained a detailed classification of purchases and sales of a large number of these elevators and exchanges, it was possible for purposes of analysis to classify most of them according to the principal products handled. This was done on the basis of value of sales or of the proportion which each commodity or group of commodities contributed toward the total gross margin taken by the association. The groups into which products and supplies were combined were: produce, grains, feed and flour, petroleum products and auto supplies, hardware, and groceries. In hardware were included all products ordinarily handled by hardware stores in Missouri, namely, farm machinery, paints, seeds, twine, sacks, fencing, fertilizers, lime, and building materials. A large number of exchanges handled a wide variety of supplies to hold business. For example, many exchanges felt themselves forced into grocery lines in order to hold the egg business because chain stores were taking eggs in trade for groceries and drawing patron-members away from their association. Very few of the associations handling farm implements were satisfied with that line of merchandise.

The oldest existing cooperative in Missouri, a local creamery, was organized in 1892, and a fruit association has been operating since the following year. Few associations organized prior to 1918 were in existence. The elevators and exchanges doing business in 1935 were started principally



during the five years, 1919-1924. More than three-fourths of them were organized in that period, 30 per cent of them having been set up in a single year, 1920.

All the exchanges and elevators were incorporated. Slightly less than 85 per cent of them were incorporated under the 1919 law providing for capital stock associations, 13 per cent were organized under provisions of the 1923 non-stock, non-profits act, and 2 per cent were operating under the general business corporation laws. Less than one-half of the livestock and fruit shipping associations were incorporated; the rest were set up under the non-stock, non-profits act. One-half of the local creameries, having been established prior to enactment of statutes providing for incorporation of cooperative associations, were still operating under general business corporation laws.

The remainder of these results will be concerned only with elevators and exchanges because these associations do practically all the local cooperative business in Missouri. The discussion is concerned with the factors which are believed to contribute most to the success of local cooperative associations. Undoubtedly, one of these factors is management, the manager and board of directors. The size of the board of directors is important. The most common numbers of directors for local associations were five and seven. Forty per cent of the associations had five directors, another forty per cent had seven, twelve per cent had nine, and the remaining eight per cent had other numbers ranging from three to sixteen each. Nearly six per cent had an even number of directors. A small number of directors absolves the association from an unwieldy directorate and perhaps an expensive one if the directors are paid. In most local associations all members of the board of directors were local farmers, assuring the membership that the association was being run for producers. The interest of the directors in their associations was witnessed by their attendance at board meetings. Of the associations, nearly 60 per cent reported an average attendance of 90 per cent or more and 85 per cent an average attendance of 80 per cent or more. In a number of associations, directors were paid a *per diem* wage or mileage or both but in others they served without pay. Attendance of the directors was slightly better in the associations which paid their directors.

As for the managers of Missouri associations, they generally had had considerable experience in merchandising before taking their present position. In the smaller exchanges or elevators, the managers commonly had been helpers or bookkeepers before becoming managers. In the larger exchanges, it is quite common for the managers to have managed a smaller exchange or to have been an assistant manager or bookkeeper of the larger exchange. This is especially true of the organizations affiliated with the Missouri Farmers' Association because it is common practice for the directors of such an association in need of a manager to ask the state association for recommendations. To further their training the Missouri Farmers' Association conducts periodic regional and state-wide meetings for managers of its associated local organizations.

Another principle of good management, that of divorcing the manager from membership on the board of directors, is also widely practiced. In very few instances was the manager also a director. There are some indications, however, that the directors of some associations may encroach upon the duties of the manager. For example, in 41 per cent of the local exchanges and elevators the regular employees as well as the manager were chosen by the board of directors. This certainly limited the control of the manager over the personnel. In only rare instances, however, had the directors exercised this power to the extent of employing relatives.

In most instances the directors and managers were getting adequate information to keep them well-informed about the financial condition of the association. Most Missouri associations used accounting systems which were satisfactory. Furthermore, the books of most associations were audited at least once a year by independent auditors who directed the attention of the managers and directors to weaknesses of the associations.

Another factor affecting the success of local cooperative associations is its efforts to keep expenses under control. There is a tendency for persons handling other people's money to be less careful about spending it. One method of control is to place the manager on a budget and make it necessary for him to justify to the board of directors any departure from that budget. Preparation of budgets for merchandising organizations, however, is an arduous job because the amount

of business to be done in the next year is not easily forecasted. The best substitute for the budget is the comparison of expenses of the present year to date with those of the previous year for the same period. Many associations in Missouri were making such comparisons available to their directors at the monthly meetings.

The expenses during 1935 of 161 cooperative elevators and exchanges in Missouri are shown in the table below. These are associations for which operating figures appeared comparable and reliable; all others were excluded. They had an average sales volume of slightly more than \$100,000 during that year.

AVERAGE OPERATING EXPENSES OF 161 ELEVATORS AND EXCHANGES, MISSOURI, 1935

Item	Average Expense	Per Cent of Total	Expense per Dollar of Sales (Cents)
Management and labor	\$3167	56.6	\$ 3.05
Fixed property expense	1266	22.6	1.22
General expense	636	11.4	0.61
Inventory expense	369	6.6	0.36
Promotion expense	116	2.1	0.11
Other	42	0.7	0.04
Total	\$5596	100.0	\$ 5.39
Truck expense	299	---	0.29
Credit expense	129	---	0.12
Total	\$6024	---	\$ 5.80

The managers' salaries ranged from \$30 to \$200 per month, with an average of \$86. In a few instances the managers were paid a commission. A few, also, were given bonuses for their efforts.

In general, the local associations in Missouri follow a conservative policy in charging depreciation on buildings and equipment. They charge from 3 per cent to 7 per cent depreciation on buildings, 10 to 15 per cent on machinery and equipment, and 20 to 33 and one-third per cent on trucks and automobiles. The usual rates are 3, 10, and 25 per cent respectively. Many of the associations had their entire machinery, equipment, and trucks written off in 1930. Another indication of sound control of expenses was the type and initial cost

of buildings occupied by the associations. Only rarely had expensive elaborate buildings been erected; in most cases, the building had been bought at a second-hand, seemingly reasonable figure. In very few instances were the exchanges located on the main street, where sites are more costly.

Despite their care in keeping down ordinary operating expenses, many of the associations were still paying income tax in 1935. This situation, however, was rapidly being remedied. For example, the Missouri Farmers' Association spent considerable effort in 1936 and 1937 in obtaining exemptions for the local associations affiliated with it.

Gross operating costs are important but to be really significant, they must be reduced to units costs. In determining the unit cost of doing business the volume of business is very important. For 161 local elevators and exchanges in Missouri the volume of sales ranged from \$19,000, or approximately \$60 per sales day, to \$483,000, or nearly \$1500 per day. The effect of volume of business on operating costs is shown in the following table:

OPERATING EXPENSES PER ASSOCIATION AND PER \$100 OF SALES, BY SIZE OF ASSOCIATION, FOR 161 ELEVATORS AND EXCHANGES, MISSOURI, 1935

Sales Volume	Number of Associations	Average Volume	Average Expenses*	Expenses per \$100 of Sales*
Less than \$ 25,000	6	\$ 20,870	\$ 1,633	\$ 7.82
\$ 25,000 — 50,000	38	39,838	2,433	6.11
50,000 — 75,000	27	60,141	3,745	6.23
75,000 — 100,000	24	85,734	5,012	5.85
100,000 — 150,000	33	121,295	6,628	5.46
150,000 — 200,000	18	179,407	9,075	5.06
200,000 or more	15	278,502	13,014	4.67
Total	161	\$103,746	\$5,596	\$5.39

\*Excluding credit and truck expense

The effect of volume of business on costs brings up an important problem of what to do with some Missouri cooperatives which are too close together. Should such associations be consolidated or must the weaker ones be permitted to die a slow, painful death? Consider the case of two associations within five miles of each other. One had a volume



of \$43,000; the other, \$234,000. It cost the small association \$8.70 per \$100 of sales to operate in 1935, while the larger one was run for \$6.60 per \$100 of sales and provided more and better services for its members. Furthermore, the members of the small association ordinarily trade in the town where the large association is located. Beyond doubt the large exchange will some day take over all the business of the small one, and the members of the latter will lose their investment. Although the consolidation of associations is a difficult task, it appears that a program of this sort should be attempted in order to prevent many members from losing their investment and becoming sour on the cooperative movement.

Another factor is the financial organization and condition of associations. Most Missouri cooperatives were organized with capital stock. Some associations are now shifting to a membership organization, with certificates of indebtedness as the source of capital. Although the sale of stock provided the original capital for most associations, one-fourth of the net worth was in the form of surplus and reserves at the end of 1935. Furthermore, as previously stated, fixed property commonly has been depreciated to considerably less than its actual value.

One of the problems many associations were having was that of keeping capital stock in the hands of those doing business with the association. In 45 per cent of the associations, less than 80 per cent of the stockholders were patrons of the association. In 18 per cent of the associations, less than 60 per cent of the stockholders patronized their organization. This problem arises because so many of the associations have been in existence for a long period. The amount of stock which may be held by one person is limited to 10 per cent by the cooperative capital-stock association law of Missouri. Dividends on stock are limited to 8 per cent. Of course, the actual rate of dividend paid by associations varies according to the ability of the association to obtain a profit on its operations. For 1935, 44 per cent of the elevators and exchanges paid no dividends, 26 per cent paid 8 per cent and 16 per cent paid 6 per cent. One organized under business corporation laws paid its limit of 10 per cent. Each of the rest paid dividends of from 2 to 7 per cent.

Associations in Missouri came out of the depression in



fairly good financial condition. The average statement of condition for 250 elevators and exchanges shows the following:

STATEMENT OF CONDITION, 250 ELEVATORS AND EXCHANGES,  
MISSOURI, DECEMBER 31, 1935

ASSETS		
<i>Current Assets</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Per Cent of Total</i>
Cash	\$1680	10.0
Accounts receivable	2234	13.2
Notes receivable	337	2.0
Merchandise inventory	4326	25.7
Other current assets	490	1.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$ 8767</b>	<b>52.0</b>
<i>Fixed Assets</i>		
Buildings and equipment	7491	44.4
<i>Investments</i>	257	1.5
<i>Other Assets</i>	347	2.1
<b>Total Assets</b>	<b>\$16,862</b>	<b>100.0</b>
LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH		
<i>Current Liabilities</i>		
Accounts payable	\$1037	6.1
Notes payable	1646	9.8
Accrued expense	223	1.3
Other current liabilities	260	1.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$ 3175</b>	<b>18.8</b>
<i>Fixed Liabilities</i>		
Mortgages	1347	8.0
<i>Net Worth</i>		
Members' interest—capital stock or certificates of indebtedness	\$9254	54.9
Surplus and reserves	3086	18.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>12,340</b>	<b>73.2</b>
<b>Total Liabilities and Net Worth</b>	<b>\$16,862</b>	<b>100.0</b>

This consolidated statement indicates that the successful associations have followed a rather consistent policy of setting aside reserves to build up their capital. Of the 250 associations, 186, or nearly three-fourths, had accumulated reserves and surpluses totaling more than \$1,000,000. Reserves amounted to 40 per cent or more of the value of all assets in 46 associations and to 20 per cent or more in 120 associations, or nearly one-half of the total number. On the other hand, 64 associations had deficits. These deficits were equal to 40 per cent or

more of the total assets in 26 associations. Only four associations, however, had deficits sufficient to wipe out their members' interests.

Another factor in the success of a local association is its membership relations. While the associations themselves rarely brought their member-patrons together, this objective was accomplished for those associations affiliated with the Missouri Farmers' Association by the local farm club meetings at which the manager of the association might discuss his problems. Very few associations in Missouri reveal financial statements to their members.

One means of building up membership interest is the patronage dividend. About 28 per cent of the associations paid patronage dividends for 1935. There was considerable variation among associations in the method of paying such dividends. In associations affiliated with the Missouri Farmers' Association, the patronage dividend generally was paid only to patrons who were members of the Missouri Farmers' Association. In addition, dividends were often limited to purchases or sales of particular commodities or groups of commodities. A greater proportion of patrons were members in associations paying dividends than in those not doing so.

Another factor affecting the success of a local cooperative association is its methods of handling the product and of determining prices. Local creameries and fruit associations pay each producer on the basis of sales returns from his actual product, less expenses. On the other hand, the exchanges and elevators buy products and sell supplies outright. These latter associations have the problem of obtaining a sufficient margin between buying and selling prices to meet expenses. Although information as to the margin necessary for each product is not available, the margins actually taken on certain products and supplies are of interest. On eggs the average margin was 2.7 per cent; on poultry, 4.2 per cent; and on cream, 7.5 per cent. For all produce it was 4.3 per cent. On wheat and corn the average margins taken were 4.2 and 4.4 per cent respectively; on feeds, 7.6 per cent; on flour, 6.4 per cent, and on salt, 13 per cent. For all grains, feeds, and flour the margin was 6.1 per cent.

**SUMMARY:** There were 410 local farmers' cooperative marketing and purchasing associations in Missouri in 1935.

This included 313 exchanges and elevators, 54 livestock shipping associations, 27 fruit shipping associations, 8 local creameries, and 8 miscellaneous local associations. In addition, there were 29 large scale associations within the state.

The volume of business of the local associations amounted to more than \$31,000,000 in 1935. Of this, more than \$29,000,000 was sales of elevators and exchanges. Large scale associations accounted for approximately \$29,000,000 of business, making the total for all cooperatives in excess of \$60,000,000.

Factors contributing to the success of Missouri cooperatives are: good management, adequate auditing and control of expenses, sound financial organization and policies, satisfactory membership relations, and efficient methods of handling farm products and supplies.

## SOME PUBLIC AND BUSINESS POLICIES EMBODIED IN THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX

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The inquiring mind early learns that "things are not always what they seem". To one uninitiated into the complexities of our Federal income tax law and its administration, it might seem sufficient to know that it was most fortunately enacted just in time to provide the great bulk of tax support for the World War, and that it is still the most productive Federal tax. Certainly for some taxpayers it is the most irritating contact with Uncle Sam in person.

Nevertheless, like the tariff laws, the income tax law, seemingly "*for revenue only*", actually embodies, first, a number of instances of public policy, though the inclusion of certain of them in the Act may be less due to deliberate Congressional decisions than to subconscious acceptance of current sociological and political mores; and second, such public policies, together with some legal and accounting pronouncements within the Act and its subsequent interpretation by the Treasury Department and the Federal Courts, inevitably lead business concerns, especially corporations, to consider and to adopt managerial policies in the conduct of their manufacturing, marketing, and financial departments which cause the company to be subject to the least tax. It is this perennial inventiveness of the American business man in finding new ways of doing business, which underlies the recent and current attacks by representatives of the Treasury Department and by President Roosevelt upon "tax avoidance".

The continuing controversy in state legislatures concerning proper sources of revenue for supporting the states' institutions and activities has in recent years brought an increasing adoption of this type of tax, which is now used by more than half the states, including Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico. In most of them, as in the Federal law, the incomes of both individuals and corporations are taxed. Individual rates of the Federal tax are graduated from 4 to 89 per cent, while corporations are taxed on a series of bases (often erroneously called separate taxes), which could in

extreme instances range from a total of 8 per cent to approximately 85 per cent of net profit for the year. Obviously the matter is one of serious concern to business.

In administering the Revenue Act, as it is called, the Congress, the Treasury Department, the Board of Tax Appeals, and the Federal Courts all have active parts, and have produced an already voluminous and almost daily changing set of regulations, interpretations, and decisions. For those who wish instructions in meeting the governments' requirements, these are available (as are tax specialists), and they will not be dealt with here. (See F. N. 2, *infra*.)

Customs duties or tariff, and excise or licensing taxes are commonly known to be used for non-revenue purposes, particularly to prohibit, encourage, or regulate certain forms of business activity. Similar use of the income tax, so far as the writer is aware, has not been noted in the literature produced by accountants or lawyers, and very little more in the work of economists.

It would be quite impossible in a brief treatment to trace fully the ramifications of more than a very few instances of such indirect influences of the Act upon business concerns. Consequently, a considerable number of essentially *ex cathedra* conclusions are presented, in the hope that by this method a more comprehensive appreciation of the social implications and applications of the law may be had.<sup>1</sup>

In referring to business policies of corporations "embodied" in the tax law, it is merely meant that adoption of such policies by a corporation will adjust the concern's actions to the Act so as to yield the least tax. Since Congress doubtless is quite aware of the profit motive, it should be assumed that it expects or even desires the activities of the business man or corporation to be so conducted.

Finally, it should be observed that in citing public policies "embodied" in the law, the writer does not claim such complete omniscience as to know whether or to what extent

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<sup>1</sup>Detailed documentation in support of the numerous conclusions presented, while giving an appearance of erudition, would tend to confuse those not already familiar with this technical field, and be of no great value to those who are. Readers desiring to verify or pursue further the judgments expressed in this paper are referred to loose-leaf encyclopedic services, the best known being Alexander Publishing Company; Commerce Clearing House; and Prentice Hall, Inc.



Congress or its members actually intended to so incorporate national policy in what to some might seem to be an unlikely medium. It is merely intended to set out, on the ground that "action speaks louder than words", the policies which the Act as written actually encourages. If these include "policies" not intended or not desirable, exposing them to view may encourage citizens and members of Congress to alter or eliminate them.

*Public Policy Embodied in the Income Tax Act:* As contrasted with a general sales tax, the income tax expresses the policy of securing financial support for the government from the class generally called wealthy, or at least that class having the financial "ability to pay." Relatively speaking, the sales tax obviously bears most heavily upon those classes in the lowest income levels. Closely akin to this policy is that of redistribution of wealth, or more exactly, of income. This is done by exempting from the tax single persons with annual incomes under \$1,000, and married couples under \$2,500; and by applying progressive tax rates (from 4 per cent to 75 per cent) on those having increasingly greater incomes.

The very origin of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which legalized the income tax (1913), indicates the deliberate public policy of placing a tax burden upon the wealthier sections of the nation in order to provide Federal assistance to weaker states or areas. The annual reports of the Secretary of the Treasury show the extraordinary disparity in the income tax paid by our various states. The South is to an especial degree the beneficiary of this Amendment.

A policy involving ethical ideals is that of collecting an income tax from gains illegally derived. The Constitution authorizes taxation of gains "from whatever source derived". Al Capone now resides in Alcatraz Federal Prison because he failed to share his ill-gotten gains with Uncle Sam. It may be noted that even if taxing such income gives legal recognition of its existence, it falls short of legitimatizing them. It places a tax burden on such unsocial activities, which is already placed upon legal and socially approved livelihoods, and therefore prevents favoring illegal means of securing income. Also, as in Capone's case, it forces the light of investigation and public accounting upon such illegal sources, and thereby, to some extent, discourages their practice.

A full application of the Constitutional grant of power to tax "incomes from whatever source derived" would embody the policy of complete centralization of American government, that is, a policy of weakening if not eliminating the exercise of governmental functions by the forty-eight separate states. This follows from the possibility under the Constitution (income tax amendment) of so severely taxing income received by employees of a state or its bond-holders that none would care to serve or lend to the separate states. If, at first thought, such a possibility appears to be fantastic, reference need only be made to the Treasury Department recommendations to this effect before the current session of Congress. So far, however, such income has not been taxed.

Such exemption of earnings derived from states, applies, however, only in the case of those serving the state in its exercise of "an essential governmental function". Since the Supreme Court of the United States assumes the authority to decide what are such essential functions of government, the federal government in effect uses the income tax to urge upon states the national government's conception of the type of activity appropriate for the so-called "sovereign" states. For example, the necessity for paying federal income taxes on the part of state employees operating South Dakota's government bank makes less attractive such employment; the same conclusion applies with respect to the operation of a state-owned cafeteria at a state university.

The tax has provided opportunity for international co-operation, especially to avoid duplication in taxation. An American corporation or individual doing business in France, say, or Mexico is subject to tax upon his profits by both nations. A reciprocal arrangement is available under which our government refrains from collecting the amount which is due the foreign government. Also, our neighbors north and south, Canadians and Mexicans, are given practically the same considerate treatment in the matter of personal exemptions and the like as are granted to our own citizens.

The ambition of New York financiers to have Wall Street supplant the "Old Lady of Threadneedle Street" as the world's financial center is supported by exempting from tax foreign government deposits in our banks, as well as gains made by governments through investment in securities on our exchanges.

The philosopher, sociologist, and political scientist may find aspects of the law in actual operation, which unexpectedly illustrate principles of their fields.

The individualistic view in contrast to that of dependence upon others, especially for dependence upon government relief, is suggested by the total exemption of \$1,000 for a single person and \$2,500 for a married couple. In effect this suggests that until an individual has had \$1,000 for self-support he should not pay an income tax for support of governmental activities. Furthermore, personally earning one's income is encouraged, as contrasted with clipping coupons or selling property. Subject to technical upper and lower limitations, 10 per cent of one's income is tax exempt if actually "earned". Few individuals not engaged in business have consistently kept adequate accounting records. The practical effect of the law is to provide many incentives to maintain complete and detailed personal financial records, especially if securities of any sort are owned. The American people are noteworthy for the impressive amount of life insurance "carried". This means of continuing even after death our individualistic support of members of the family is encouraged by this law, which completely exempts from taxation proceeds of policies received due to death.

The federal administration has lately given its support to the movement toward returning to the community control and support of relief and other welfare agencies. The law refrains from levying a tax upon income which is contributed (within set limits) to incorporated welfare organizations, such as community chests or individual charities. Donations to individuals, however needy, is not so encouraged. Possibly administrative reasons, rather than a hard heart toward the needy or desire to promote professional social service agencies, explain this apparent favoritism toward what has been called

"Organized charity  
Chilly and iced  
In the name of a cautious  
Statistical Christ"

The family basis of social organization is favored in several ways. One is in effect an actual subsidy comparable with those offered by Mussolini for marriage and large families. It is rather startling to find that if a man marries a woman who

has had no taxable separate personal income, the fact of marriage provides him an exemption from the tax upon \$1500, providing a saving which might vary from \$60 to \$1,200 each year. Likewise, support of each child (whether of blood descent or adopted, or for that matter, a parent incapable of self support) provides a "subsidy" through reduced tax upon \$400, which provides a saving of taxes from \$16 to \$316 per year. Also home ownership is favored by permitting all taxes and interest paid for such purpose to cancel an equal sum of otherwise taxable income.

Even the place of residence is affected. Possibly it may smack of imperialism, but American citizens who will live abroad at least half the year and earn their living abroad are totally exempted from our Federal income tax upon such earnings. In conjunction with our Federal China Trade Act, still greater financial benefits are given individuals who invest and reside in that troubled place.

Possibly of even more interest is the special "favoritism" granted to those who (come to) live in Texas or any of the other seven western states originally a part of Spanish or Mexican territory. The "Community Property" feature of state law derived from the Code Napoleon is embodied in the Federal income tax; and while greatly irritating to citizens of the remaining forty states, it provides a real financial inducement to those of wealth to move to or remain within the boundaries of one of the states with this Spanish tradition. This outcome arises from the graduated tax rate structure for individuals (the greater the dollar amount of taxable income, the higher the percentage collected as personal income tax); and from the "community" legal doctrine that half the husband's income is legally the wife's, so that two tax returns are filed on which each is taxed for one-half the dollar amount, but both are taxed in a lower "bracket" at a lower percentage.

Finally, the public policy of influencing business concerns, especially corporations, to conduct their affairs in certain ways, or to refrain from others is embodied in the Revenue Act in many places. For emphasis, this will be considered from the viewpoint of corporation directors and executives who have the duty of determining corporation policies.

*Policies of Business Corporations:* The voluminous literature both of law and accounting is overflowing with evidence that Treasury Department officials and the attorneys and



accountants representing taxpayers typically have their attention focused only upon the controversy as to the amount of tax due the government as an out-come of business action admittedly already taken by the taxpayer. Any tax attorney or tax accountant can cite in illustration his unending and arduous (and increasingly unsuccessful) embattled efforts for the taxpayer, such as preparing and filing briefs and participating in hearings before the Collectors, Revenue Agents, Board of Tax Appeals, and Federal Courts.<sup>2</sup> Yet the taxpayer has various other alternatives with respect to the income tax. First, he may pay it and attempt (seldom successfully) to shift it to customers or employees; second, he may endeavor (illegally) to evade payment of his just tax; or third, he may by forethought and an active imagination, avoid so far as possible those methods of purchasing, selling, and financing which would incur a tax liability. The last named alternative of reducing taxes is more economical than the prevailing method of controversy; its legality is attested to by the Supreme Court itself;<sup>3</sup> it may be so done as to be entirely ethical; and it is fundamental and preventive in that it strikes the corporation's tax problem at the roots of business action; and it is in keeping with the sound management practices of advance planning and deliberate formation of business policies intended to bring the plans to fruition. What business operating and financing practices or policies are in use or available as means of getting business done while still holding taxes to a minimum? After several years search for matters upon which business policies should be formulated only after giving due consideration to the income tax effects, the writer is of the opinion that no activity of a business should be carried on without inquiring into the possibility and desirability of lowering taxes by some alteration in the ways of doing business.

Serious, though often indirect, pressure is exerted upon the selection of those most influential of all business policies, those which are concerned with the fundamental objectives of the enterprise, and its relationship with employees, the

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<sup>2</sup>Vide Board of Tax Appeals Reports, all Federal Court Reports, and Prentice Hall Federal Tax Service, Vols. I-IV, 1938; Commerce Clearing House Standard Tax Service, Vols. I-IV, 1938; Alexander Federal Tax Service, Vols. I-III, 1938.

<sup>3</sup>*Gregory v. Helvering*, (1935) 293 U. S. 465.



government, and society at large. The following brief treatment may show the striking range of the influence of a tax that is placed upon profits, the "prime mover" of business activity.

(1) A recent Supreme Court ruling holds that to be tax exempt, actions taken must have some relation to the fundamental *raison d'être* of the enterprise. This gives the highest sanction to the deliberate formulation of such a company-purpose, now all too rare.<sup>4</sup>

(2) In a recent Texas case it was held that actual operations are decisive if in conflict with legal form or stated purposes of a corporation, in determining tax exemption. This encourages honesty instead of legal fiction.<sup>5</sup>

(3) Corporations under the 1936 Revenue Act are permitted to contribute to community chests, thus encouraging an acceptance by them of a degree of social responsibility.

(4) The introduction of the modern managerial practice of budgeting is encouraged by the excess profits surtax in conjunction with the capital stock tax. Congress deliberately permits corporations to assess their own capital stock tax at a figure which (based on budgeted net income) will eliminate or greatly reduce the excess profits tax.

(5) The cooperative form of organization is encouraged for banking, building and loan, insurance, telephone, and marketing organizations, by exempting them from the income tax.

(6) The trust form of legal organization is discouraged in various ways.

(7) Likewise, personal investment holding companies are discouraged by extreme tax rates and otherwise.

(8) The corporate form of organization was encouraged in earlier Acts. The low rate of corporation tax relative to profits earned during the "twenties" permitted or facilitated the expansion of corporations and the nation's "capacity to produce", which was one cause of the current depression.<sup>6</sup> The 1936 Act provides more severe taxes upon the corporate form, including a graduated "normal" tax, an "excess profits"

<sup>4</sup>*Evelyn F. Gregory v. Guy T. Helvering*, U. S. Supreme Ct. No. 127, in Prentice Hall Tax Service, 1936, Paragraph 687.

<sup>5</sup>*Houston Belt and Terminal Ry. Co. v. U. S.*, 250 Fed. 1.

<sup>6</sup>Harold Moulton, et al, *America's Capacity to Produce* (and companion volumes), Brookings Institution.

tax, an "undistributed profits" tax, an "unreasonable accumulation of surplus" tax, and separate taxes upon personal holding companies. Added to this discouraging list of taxes to which the corporate form is liable is the definite encouragement now given for dissolution of subsidiary corporations. This is done by exempting from the tax any profits made by such liquidation. This may tend to simplify somewhat the complex structure of certain inter-related corporation set-ups. Certainly owners of small corporations are now given ample reason to consider reverting to sole owner status, thus avoiding the corporation tax.

(9) The combined effect of the income tax, excess profits tax, capital stock tax, penalty surtax upon unneeded surplus of ordinary corporations, and the personal holding company surtax have tended to impede the growth in size of individual corporations. The much discussed new 1936 tax upon "undistributed profits" accentuates this influence by exempting the corporation partially or entirely from this special tax if net profits are paid out as dividends currently.

(10) Diversion of corporate income streams to salaried insiders is discouraged by the requirement of reasonableness in salaries to secure deductibility. Moreover, actual services must be rendered by all persons whose remuneration the corporation wishes to count as an expense.

(11) The mere permission of deductions for "ordinary and necessary business expense" provides in effect a *subsidy* to business enterprise to encourage them to increase expense payments, notably wages. If a corporation increases remuneration of workers one million dollars, the Government will release the corporation from the income tax upon one million dollars of income. Since this tax otherwise payable would range from approximately \$150,000 to possibly \$420,000, or even more, the corporation is in effect told that the Federal Government will subsidize an increase in wages to the extent of the tax foregone. A recent research<sup>7</sup> indicates that the undistributed profits tax considered alone induced one-half our corporations to increase expenses in 1936. This is particularly true of medium size and small companies. Increased payments to employees and officers were most common, followed by increased advertising and repairs.

<sup>7</sup>W. L. Thorp, et al, in *Dun's Review*, September, 1937.

(12) The same pioneer study shows conclusively that the undistributed profits tax is actually effective in "forcing out" to stockholders the profits earned by corporations. For example, seventy per cent of the companies which paid dividends of more than 90 per cent reported that they would not have done so had it not been for this particular tax. Consequently, it may be concluded that the income tax as now drafted embodies successfully the public policy of revesting the stockholders of corporations with the power to decide such fundamental issues as the business policy of expansion or contraction of the size of the enterprise, instead of leaving the decision to an "inside" group.

Limits of space preclude the presentation of similar illustrative lists of business policies relating primarily to certain departments of a corporation. Certainly the treasurer, the factory production manager, and the sales manager continually decide to deal with employees, customers, and vendors according to a certain policy rather than another. Whenever such a choice is faced, they may have an opportunity to arrange the transaction in such manner as to diminish or defer the income tax applicable to a profitable outcome of the "deal". As a single example, to change selling terms from "open credit account" to the "installment" note method will always defer and generally decrease the tax payable.

*To Summarize:* The Topsy-like growth of the Federal income tax, together with the complexities inherent in the subject matter involving law and accounting particularly, have embodied in the law a number of public policies of which the usual citizen and taxpayer (and some congressmen) are probably not aware. Such implications are believed to be worthy of attention in order that inconsistencies and favoritisms may be eliminated.

As for the avoidance of the tax, especially by corporations, through the adoption of policies and practices with that object in view, two generalizations seem pertinent.

First: Our national experience with the Federal income tax, while relatively brief, has progressed, in the main, beyond the stage of sheer illegal *evasion* into what is essentially the stage of legal and accounting controversy as to the *size* of the particular tax bill; and

Second: An opportunity exists throughout all types of business enterprise and all departments of each particular

business concern to conduct intelligently all business operations in such manner that taxes will be paid upon only those profit-yielding activities which Congress apparently desires to burden with the tax.

Of course, if the policies (public or business) actually embodied in the Act, as revealed by such inquiries as the present, are not defensible or intended, they should be removed from the Act. In the meantime, it is surely desirable that legal and accounting bickering over the amount of tax due be replaced by honestly turning business activities into the channels that Congress and the Courts point out as not to be "penalized" with the tax.

If enterprise were generally so conducted, as some of the larger ones now are, the demands of legality, ethics, and the normal desire to enjoy the honest and hard-earned fruits of business energy and foresight would be more nearly integrated; and incidentally an advance would have been made in both the fields of accounting and business management.

## MUNICIPAL POLICE ORGANIZATION\*

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One of the most notable features of municipal government has been the tendency toward experimentation with various organizational patterns. Municipal reformers and students of administration alike have engaged in a continuous quest for a formula designed to eliminate those structures which have proved unable to cope effectively with the increasing burdens placed on the government, and to install in their stead a device which would perform the necessary services in a more efficient manner. The fluidity of municipal administrative structure has directly affected the organization designed to meet the police needs of the community, and, even where no general reorganizations have been effected, constant experimentation has characterized the police administrative structure until recent years.<sup>1</sup> In this regard American cities differ markedly from those of England, which have utilized the same general features of police organization since the creation of modern police departments.<sup>2</sup>

Efforts toward reorganization in the police structure have been limited in large part, however, to variations in the pattern of control. Resort to police commissions, state control, popular election, and civilian commissioners has been made for the purpose of correcting and reforming municipal police units which have become honeycombed with graft and corrupt influences. The result of these attempts to divorce municipal police administration from "politics" has been to delay attention to the internal police structure until recent times. Moreover, the general practice of according a brief tenure to police executives with corresponding changes among the superior officers of the department has militated against any continuous study of structural needs.

The deficiencies of the police structure and the failure to follow the principles of administrative organization which

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\*The facilities of the Bureau of Municipal Research of The University of Texas were used by the author in the preparation of this article.

<sup>1</sup>Raymond B. Fosdick, *American Police Systems* (New York, 1920), Ch. II.

<sup>2</sup>"The Centenary of Watch Committees," *Police Chronicle and Constabulary World*, No. 43 (September 6, 1935), 1.



have been adopted in general management are revealed in the recent surveys of the police departments of Kansas City, Minneapolis, Chicago, San Francisco, and other cities. There appears to be a definite organizational lag in police administration; the pleasant policy of following the practice of his predecessor has been adopted by the police executive, with the result that continuous revaluations of the police structure in the light of current requirements have not occurred. The impact of recent developments in police communication and transportation, however, has given impetus to a renewed attention to reorganization.

Organization has been defined as "the arrangement of personnel for facilitating the accomplishment of some agreed purpose through the allocation of functions and responsibilities. It is the relating of efforts and capacities of individuals and groups engaged upon a common task in such way as to secure the desired objective with the least friction and the most satisfaction to those for whom the task is done and those engaged in the enterprise."<sup>3</sup> It will be noted that this definition stresses the non-mechanical features of organization, and emphasizes the importance of flexibility and the definite need for a consideration of the individuals comprising the association in constructing an organization. Organization is not a completed blueprint handed down from above to be followed without question; the capabilities of its members and the stresses to which it is subject will call for periodical readjustments.

The basic principle of organization is coordination, which concerns the relating of the efforts of a particular group to a common purpose.<sup>4</sup> Coordination may be thought of as perpendicular and horizontal.<sup>5</sup> Perpendicular coordination is based on authority and is accompanied directly by responsibility; authority is the supreme coordinating influence and takes form in leadership. Leadership effects the purposes of the organization by the delegation of authority from the superior to the subordinate, with the superior remaining responsible

<sup>3</sup>John M. Gaus, "A Theory of Organization in Public Administration," in *The Frontiers of Public Administration* (Chicago, 1936), 66-67.

<sup>4</sup>James D. Mooney, "The Principles of Organization," in Luther Gulick and L. Urwick, Editors, *Papers on the Science of Administration* (New York, 1937), 91-98.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 93, 95-96.

for the execution of the tasks imposed. The purpose of delegation is to secure coordination of the functions, that is, the different types of duties, which combined form the original motive of the organization. Horizontal coordination is concerned in part with the various agencies which, in addition to providing the executive with information, advice, counsel, and, to some extent, assisting in supervision and control, also perform certain definite operations such as purchasing and budgeting.

The police function enters into the structure of the municipal administration at the place where functional differentiation begins and is therefore on the same plane in the general organization as health, fire, public works, and other municipal functions. The internal arrangements of the police organization are determined in part by the purposes of its creation, which may be listed briefly as (1) the repression of crime, (2) the detection and apprehension of offenders and assistance in their prosecution, (3) traffic regulation, and (4) certain special functions, such as vice control and crime prevention. This list by no means exhausts the duties which have been imposed on police organizations,<sup>6</sup> but it notes the major motives for their existence, and so provides a basis for fashioning a police structure to meet the law enforcement needs of the community.

The activities of a police organization may be divided into those which are primary and represent the purposes outlined above, and those which are auxiliary but essential aids in the realization of the primary purposes. To distinguish these two types of activities an ordinary burglary complaint may be cited. The citizen telephones the police and reports the offense, which is recorded at the central complaint desk by the desk sergeant or complaint officer. A motor patrolman is dispatched immediately by radio to make a preliminary investigation. If the offense is not capable of immediate solution, a detective is assigned to pursue an investigation which

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<sup>6</sup>Some of the more common special activities required of the police are licensing, provision of public ambulance service, supervision of paroled convicts, inspection, registration of voters and verification of poll lists, enumeration of inhabitants, temporary care of the destitute, conduct of free employment agencies, and the operation of dog pounds. Bruce Smith, "Municipal Police Administration," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CXLVI (November, 1929), 3.

involves such actions as noting the method of entrance, the object of attack in the form of money, clothing, etc., and the type of building entered. A list of the stolen property is made available to dealers in these articles, and the investigator, usually one experienced in this particular type of offense, begins his search.

The major purpose of this routine is the apprehension of the offender and the recovery of the property. In their investigations, however, the patrolman and the detective are assisted by certain auxiliary aids. The first of these is the means of communication. The telephone forms the link between the citizen and the police department, and radio is employed in dispatching the patrolman to the scene. The recording of the offense at headquarters and the subsequent addition of supplementary reports covering additional steps taken in the inquiry are added to the original complaint and form a complete account of all police action as a result of this particular offense. Moreover, the records system of the police department, including, among other features, *modus operandi* files explaining the method of operation of certain offenders, pawnshop files, fingerprint records, and other sources of information, are utilized by the investigator in his efforts at apprehension. The personal element also enters into the case in that in larger departments a detective experienced in burglary investigations will be assigned to cases of this character.

From this example, then, it may be noted that while the police organization internally must be ordered in such fashion as to permit the realization of the major purposes, auxiliary services in the form of particular aids constitute an important and necessary segment of the organization. The following dichotomy may assist in clarifying this distinction:

Primary Functions	Auxiliary Services
1. Crime Repression	1. Secretarial
2. Criminal Investigation	2. Personnel
3. Traffic Regulation	3. Records
4. Special Functions	4. Communication
a. Vice Control	5. Property Management
b. Crime Prevention	

It does not follow from the listing in separate columns of the primary functions and auxiliary services of the police

organization that a two-fold division is found immediately under the police executive. Instead, in those instances where the personnel of the police organization is numerically large enough to permit specialization, the auxiliary services will be clustered around the chief of police or his deputies in a headquarters division, and the primary functions will be directly below the executive. The purpose of the distinction made here is to emphasize the respective roles of primary functions and auxiliary services in the police program; there will necessarily be continuous and intimate relationships between the two. The primary functions form the end purpose of the police organization; the auxiliary services are only means to an end, and the sole reason for their existence is that they assist in the more effective realization of the primary functions.

The primary activities of patrol, criminal investigation, traffic regulation, vice control, and crime prevention constitute the functional bases of the police organization. Crime repression is the first duty of the patrol division, although it may overlap somewhat with criminal investigation in those departments which require the investigation of minor offenses by the patrol officer. More serious offenses are detailed to the criminal investigation division for study and solution. Traffic regulation comprises the enforcement of traffic ordinances as well as the broader programs of engineering and education. Vice control continues as one of the most troublesome and difficult problems of police administration, and for that reason has been separated in many instances from the criminal investigation division to which formerly it was usually attached. Finally, the increasing interest devoted to crime prevention in the form of attention to juvenile offenses has been accepted in many jurisdictions as a regular duty of the police.<sup>7</sup>

The principal auxiliary services are those relating to the performance of secretarial duties, personnel administration, records, communication, and property management. Secretarial duties refer to the activities of the secretary of the

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<sup>7</sup>The primary functions here listed may be challenged on the ground that some do not fit readily into the traditional police pattern. The inclusion of traffic regulation and vice control is especially open to criticism on this score. Nevertheless, at present the major duties of the police are those listed and the municipal police organization must provide for their inclusion.



department. Through this office many of the routine police relations with the remaining staff and line agencies of the municipal administration are conducted. Whether the police personnel is selected by an independent agency or by departmental authority, questions regarding the training, placement, rating, and promotion of officers retain a position of first importance. Records constitute the basic auxiliary service, providing a source of information for a more effective administrative control.<sup>8</sup> Communication facilitates citizen contact with the police and permits a more flexible dispersal of the personnel in a manner not possible prior to the development of police radio communication. The management of equipment, in view of the increasing motorization of the police and the utilization of other technical aids, bears directly on the effectiveness of the primary divisions.

While the general framework of the police organization will be determined on the basis of the primary functions and auxiliary services, a number of additional factors complicate the structure in larger cities. The geographical element enters when the spatial scope of police activities is such as to make necessary the permanent maintenance of precinct stations.<sup>9</sup> Supervision assumes added importance under such conditions. In smaller police departments all activities can be handled from one headquarters building and the problems raised by geographical subdivisions are eliminated.

The recent adaptation of improved communication and transportation facilities to police work and the expansion of police science have combined to force an increasing centralization designed to simplify the police organization and to

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<sup>8</sup>O. W. Wilson, "The Use of Records in Administering Police Activities," *City Manager Yearbook*, 1933, 152-60.

<sup>9</sup>Precinct stations are found in all cities over 300,000 population with one exception. In the cities over 500,000 population the range in number of stations (including headquarters) is from seven in Milwaukee to eighty-four in New York City. In the group from 300,000 to 500,000 the range is from one in Indianapolis to fifteen in Washington, D. C. St. Louis Governmental Research Institute, *Comparative Police Data, St. Louis and Other Cities Over 300,000 Population* (1937), 20. For specific examples, see Leonard V. Harrison, *Police Administration in Boston* (Cambridge, 1934), 158-69; San Francisco Bureau of Governmental Research, "Police Department Survey Report," *The City*, XVII (July 7, 1937), 63; and Providence Governmental Research Bureau, *Survey and Report on the Providence Police Department*, (1933), 20-24.



provide a more adequate control. As has been stated in the instance of another jurisdiction:

When New Scotland Yard was built, police duties were of a simple and straightforward character as compared with the present day. There were no motor cars and practically no traffic laws; the work in connection with the prevention and detection of crime was not directed and supervised centrally to the extent that it is today; finger prints had not been introduced and criminal records were only beginning to be developed; and the whole of the present system of communication was in its infancy. There is no branch of police work that has not in the last forty years become immensely more complicated, *more subject to central control and supervision and more scientific*. Each department must have its own group of experts and specialists, and *every new development involves more and more central supervision*.<sup>10</sup>

Among other results, this general trend has led to serious doubts as to the efficacy of the precinct station as a basis of police organization. The necessity of extreme geographical decentralization is now being questioned in view of the adoption of improved methods of transportation and communication in the police field, and efforts are being made to secure a reduction in number or the total elimination of the precinct station in order to effect the release of personnel for active outside duty.<sup>11</sup>

Unlike most of the remaining municipal departments, the police organization must be fashioned so as to meet the demands for continuous operation. If the offenses requiring police attention were distributed evenly both as to time of occurrence and as to location, the organizational needs could be easily answered. It is a matter of common knowledge, however, that the complaints necessitating police action ordinarily fall to their lowest point in the early morning hours and reach a peak during the early evening period.<sup>12</sup> In addition, certain sociological factors, such as slum areas and

<sup>10</sup>*Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis for the Year 1934* (Cmd. 4866, London, 1935), 8; italics mine.

<sup>11</sup>In addition to the various surveys cited above, see New Orleans Bureau of Governmental Research, *Report on the Patrol Service and Precinct Stations of the New Orleans Police Department* (1934), 4-13, and Portland Police Survey Commission, *Survey of the Bureau of Police, Portland, Oregon* (1934), 23-25.

<sup>12</sup>Edwin Lee White and E. C. Denstaedt, "Police Radio Communication," *Electrical Engineering*, LVI (May, 1937), 529, and Los Angeles Police Department, *Annual Report, 1936-37*, 50.

racial characteristics of the population, tend toward a concentration of the crime load in particular sections of the municipality.<sup>13</sup> An equitable distribution of police personnel is predicated, therefore, on a scientifically constructed beat organization, which through periodic readjustments will be able to meet changes in the incidence and weight of the crime load.

The application of the primary-auxiliary distinction to the functions of the police organization implies the separation of the two kinds of duties for purposes of supervision and control. Particularly is this true in the larger departments where the amount of work and the numerical strength reach formidable proportions. As the basic auxiliary service, it is especially important that the record division be removed from the control of the primary divisions.<sup>14</sup> The failure to realize the auxiliary character of police records is shown in many departments where records, including criminal identification, have been placed in the criminal investigation division.<sup>15</sup> In such instances the records are not available for use elsewhere without irritating delays, and, as a result, small but permanent record bureaus tend to multiply throughout the department. Combinations of auxiliary services are necessary in the smaller departments and the record division serves as the proper point for the amalgamation of the duties relating to personnel administration, communication, and property management.<sup>16</sup> The necessity for similar combinations occurs in the instance of the primary divisions. The traffic and patrol functions may be consolidated in a uniform division; vice control may

<sup>13</sup>The crime problem of Cincinnati is concentrated in the "basin" area which embraces four of a total of seventy-three square miles within the municipal limits. Cincinnati Regional Crime Committee, *The Cincinnati Police Beat Survey* (American Public Welfare Association, 1936), 1.

<sup>14</sup>It should not be implied that the record division will keep all records. Many police records are maintained by both auxiliary and primary divisions in their daily routine. The record division serves as the permanent depository of all written records of police activities so as to facilitate reference to them.

<sup>15</sup>For the experience of a particular city, see Citizens' Police Committee, *A Manual of Crime Records Procedure for the Chicago Police Department* (Report No. 6, Revised Draft, 1930), 3.

<sup>16</sup>See the recommendations for Pasadena in International Association of Chiefs of Police, *Manual of Police Records* (1931), 5, and for Greenwich in Public Administration Service, *Survey of the Police Department of Greenwich, Connecticut* (1937), 4-6.

be, and in many departments is, a duty of the criminal investigation division; while crime prevention may not be considered a police function. So long as the numerical strength of the police is sufficient to permit specialization, the distinction between primary functions and auxiliary services is useful in police organization.

Within the police organization the question arises as to the number of subordinates which should report directly to the police executive. That this question is of practical significance is attested by recent police surveys which indicate the presence of a large number of divisions, the heads of which are subject to supervision by the chief of police.<sup>17</sup> Psychological studies have indicated that the "span of attention" of a particular individual is limited, and students of organization have raised the problem of the "span of control",<sup>18</sup> which means the number of activities that one individual can supervise in an effective manner without either neglecting his responsibility for coordination or becoming immersed in departmental routine.

The span of control of the police executive will be conditioned by certain factors, including diversification of function, time, and space.<sup>19</sup> The functions of the police organization are becoming more diversified, as evidenced by the presence of communication engineering, the various components of police science, and the maintenance of records. The police organization is far from being static in that constant reappraisal is required if there is to be a scientific distribution of personnel on the basis of need. The element of space makes supervision more difficult in those police organizations subdivided geographically on the basis of precincts. It may be concluded, therefore, that the span of control of the police executive in the small department with a single headquarters building will be much wider than that of a chief of police

<sup>17</sup>At one time in 1931, forty-nine departmental divisions were supervised directly by the Commissioner of Police of Chicago. Bruce Smith, *Chicago Police Problems, An Approach to Their Solution* (New York, 1934), 14. See also, San Francisco Bureau of Governmental Research, *op. cit.*, 61; Public Administration Service, *op. cit.*, 4; and New Haven Taxpayers, Inc., *Proposals for Reorganizing New Haven's Police Department and Recording Methods* (Report No. 16, 1937), 2.

<sup>18</sup>V. A. Graicunas, "Relationship in Organization," in Luther Gulick and L. Urwick, Editors, *op. cit.*, 183-87.

<sup>19</sup>Luther Gulick, "Notes on the Theory of Organization," *ibid.*, 7-9.

in a large department with extensive geographical subdivision. In both instances, however, the need for freedom from matters of departmental routine capable of being handled by subordinates is apparent.

As originally organized, the primary functions of the municipal police consisted largely of patrol and a primitive form of criminal investigation. Successive additions in the form of traffic regulation, scientific crime detection, and crime prevention have been accompanied by the general adoption of radio communication and the motorization of the police. These recent developments have led to serious doubts as to the effectiveness of those police structures which continue to be organized on the basis of foot patrol needs. Furthermore, the extensive list of aids which have been made available for police use has necessitated attention to their proper location in the police structure. Municipal police administration is concerned with something more than thief-taking. Of basic importance in the realization of the police program is the application of methods of organization which have been found useful elsewhere.

## CAN AMERICA BE NEUTRAL?

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Two years ago three hundred and thirty-nine psychiatrists from thirty nations joined in a solemn warning that the people of the world may be headed for a war psychosis.<sup>1</sup> Events since that time seem to justify such a conclusion. Ethiopia has been incorporated in a new Roman empire in spite of the membership of both nations in the League of Nations, the Versailles treaty has been openly flouted when seemingly justified by national self-interest, the puppet-state of Manchukuo has been created in defiance of the Lytton Report, and a major undeclared war has been started in China. The arms limitation agreements ended December 31, 1936, and a feverish arms race is now on.

Even the organized peace movement seems to believe a general war is probable. One of the largest peace organizations, the National Council for Prevention of War, which until very recently has been a staunch supporter of adherence to the World Court and League of Nations, recently published a new statement of policy called "a sound, middle-of-the-road program", which is more strongly isolationist. The council claims that this program "is supported in substance by the whole American peace movement". Impliedly they are saying that peace in Europe is so precarious that the most important thing for an American peace group to do is to center its attention on keeping America out of that war. It is that same premonition of approaching warfare that has led to the present feverish excitement over the question "can America be neutral?"

Before proceeding to an answer of this question we must be clear as to the meaning of the word "neutrality", which has caused heated discussion for over a century. Beginning with the Declaration of Paris of 1856, the rights of neutrals have been further elucidated and codified at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and the London Conference of 1908-1909. As a result of these deliberations, neutrality, according to Professor Oppenheim, has been recognized "as the legal status created by the abstention of a state from all participation

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<sup>1</sup>*Science News-Letter*, October 26, 1936.



in a war, the maintenance by it of an attitude of impartiality in its dealings with belligerents and, correspondingly, the recognition by belligerents of this abstention and impartiality".<sup>2</sup> This type of neutrality was recognized by Washington who "urged that the citizens of the United States 'should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers'", and "'avoid all acts and proceedings whatsoever which may in any manner tend to contravene such disposition'".<sup>3</sup> President Wilson, in August, 1914, also stated that "every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned".<sup>4</sup> Such impartiality has been proved a myth and, even though seriously attempted by our government, has led us, due to the lack of complete belligerent recognition of such neutrality, into war in 1812 and 1917.

But today neutrality has a different meaning. Since 1919 many people have felt that the obligations of states under the Kellogg Pact and the League of Nations have rendered the old neutrality obsolete. The British government in a White Paper of 1929 said, "as between League members, there can be no neutral rights, because there can be no neutrals".<sup>5</sup> According to Professor Quincy Wright, "for the United States the Kellogg Pact alone has made neutrality illegal".<sup>6</sup>

<sup>2</sup>Oppenheim, *International Law* (London, Longmans, 1926, 4th edition. ed. by McNair), Vol. 2, p. 475; quoted by Briggs and Buell, "American Neutrality in a Future War", *Foreign Policy Reports*, April 10, 1935, p. 26.

<sup>3</sup>Dulles and Armstrong, *Can We Be Neutral?*, p. 13 Quoting *American State Papers*, "American Neutrality in a Future War", *Foreign Relations*, I, 140.

<sup>4</sup>Buell, Raymond Leslie, "The New-American Neutrality" in *Foreign Policy Reports*, Jan. 15, 1936, p. 292, quoting *Foreign Relations*, 1914, p. 551.

<sup>5</sup>Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Memorandum on the Signature by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of the Optional Clause of the Permanent Court of International Justice*. (London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1929) Cmd. 3452, p. 9-10.

<sup>6</sup>Wright, Quincy, "Neutrality and Neutral Rights Following the Pact of Paris for the Renunciation of War", in *Proceedings*, American Society of International Law (1930), p. 79, 81, 84; Shotwell, James T., *War as an Instrument of National Policy*, (New York, Harcourt, 1929), p. 223; Briggs and Buell, "American Neutrality in a Future War", in *Foreign Policy Reports*, April 10, 1935, p. 30.

Other authorities bitterly attack this view. John Bassett Moore wrote:

"As a life-long student and administrator of international law, I do not hesitate to declare the supposition that neutrality is a thing of the past to be unsound in theory and false in fact. There is not in the world today a single government that is acting upon such a supposition."<sup>7</sup>

Regardless of the correctness of either view, neutrality today is a policy not a law, "a policy which a country at peace adopts towards countries at war",<sup>8</sup> with special reference to keeping out of that war. It is this type of neutrality to which we shall direct our attention.

Any answer to our question "Can America Be Neutral?" demands also an examination of the issue as recently discussed in our legislative halls. The hastily adopted Neutrality Act of 1935 was put to the acid test by the Italo-Ethiopian imbroglio. So far as neutral rights were concerned, the act had only two provisions: first, the arms embargo, and second, withdrawal of protection to American citizens who persisted in travel in the war area. President Roosevelt also attempted to limit trade with belligerents by bringing moral pressure to bear on business interests, with the result that Standard Oil Company abandoned a proposed concession, Henry Ford declined to fill an order for 800 trucks, and other exporters were urged to keep the flow of goods at "normal" levels. Nevertheless, the monthly average trade with Italy increased 3,148 per cent from November, 1934, to November, 1935, while trade with Ethiopia dropped from \$1,662, monthly average, in 1934 to \$999 in October, 1935.<sup>9</sup>

The failure of League measures to halt Italian aggression in Ethiopia increased the demand for stronger mandatory neutrality legislation. The opening of the 75th Congress saw the introduction of fourteen neutrality bills, nine in the House and five in the Senate.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup>Moore, J. B., "The New Isolation", in *American Journal of Inter. Law*, 27, 1933, p. 607, 611.

<sup>8</sup>Dulles and Armstrong, *Can We Be Neutral?* (N. Y., Council of For. Rel., 1936).

<sup>9</sup>Buell, "The New American Neutrality", in *Foreign Policy Reports*, Jan. 15, 1936, p. 288.

<sup>10</sup>Phillips Bradley, "Neutrality—as of 1937 and 1936" in *Am. Political Science Review*, Vol. XXXI, No. 1, Feb. 1937, pp. 101-102.

The two most important of these were the Pittman-McReynolds Bill (introduced in two separate bills), favored by the Administration and allowing a large degree of Presidential discretion in applying the embargo, and the Clark-Vandenberg-Bone-Nye Bill, which was more isolationist in character and provided a mandatory neutrality policy. Besides the older general provisions prohibiting the use of American ports as bases of belligerent supplies, both plans included a National Munitions Control Board.

The Administration measure provides a mandatory embargo on arms, ammunitions, and implements of war as soon as the President shall declare the existence of a state of war. It will also be extended to any nation joining the belligerents at a later date, thus including members of the League who might find it necessary to use force against an aggressor. Financial transactions, with a possible exception of short term obligations and commercial credits, and transportation of goods to belligerents on American vessels, are also prohibited. The President may limit to normal peace time quotas all raw materials used in war except food and medical supplies. American citizens who engage in trade with belligerents or who travel on belligerent ships do so at their own risk. A remote possibility for collaboration for collective security is found in the clause allowing Congress, with the consent of the President, to decide that these embargoes shall not be applied equally to all belligerents. Dr. Buell summarizes this bill by saying that the "Bill gives the President almost complete discretion in applying embargoes and waiving traditional neutral rights; the only absolute mandatory feature is that in imposing an embargo, he may not discriminate between belligerents".<sup>11</sup>

With such a bill Senators Nye and Clark, and with them, many peace groups were not satisfied. The Clark-Vandenberg-Bone-Nye Bill made mandatory an embargo at the outbreak of war; fixed normal trade quotas for the limitation of belligerent trade; gave the President power to restrict even this normal trade; partially embodied the "cash and carry" principle; and prohibited American ships or citizens from entering areas of belligerent operations.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup>Buell, *op. cit.*, Jan. 15, 1936, p. 290.

<sup>12</sup>Buell, *op. cit.*, p. 290; S. J. Res. 60.

Clearly two major questions were debated in Congress: "discretionary versus mandatory power of the President to declare embargoes, and extension of the embargo, trade-at-risk, or peace-time-trade quota principle to war materials other than munitions."<sup>13</sup> The Neutrality Act of 1937 was really a compromise between the two viewpoints. When the President decides that a "state of war" exists between foreign powers he shall issue a proclamation to that effect and immediately the following acts become illegal:

1. Export of "arms, ammunition and implements of war" to belligerents.
2. Purchase or sale of securities or other obligations of belligerents.
3. Solicitation of war contributions.
4. Transport of implements of war in American vessels to belligerents.
5. Travel by Americans on belligerent vessels.
6. Arming of American merchantmen.

In addition, the President may use his discretion in prohibiting:

1. Transport of any article or commodity on an American vessel to a belligerent state.
2. Export of any goods to a belligerent until after "all right, title, and interest" has been transferred to a foreign government or representative.
3. Use of American ports as a basis of supply for belligerent warships.
4. Use of such ports by foreign submarines and armed merchant ships except in accordance with regulations.<sup>14</sup>

Certain provisions, usually designated as cash-and-carry, have been introduced to limit trade in, or at least remove the risk from trade in contraband goods such as cotton and oil. Loans to belligerents also become illegal after the President has issued his proclamation of a "state of war".

The chief problem involving the discretionary embargo is that of American cooperation in efforts for collective security.

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<sup>13</sup>Bradley, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

<sup>14</sup>Buell, Raymond Leslie, "The Neutrality Act of 1937", *Foreign Policy Reports*, October 1, 1937, pp. 169-170.

Shall American cooperation in efforts for collective security place an embargo on League members who may be led into hostilities while applying sanctions to an aggressor? Shall we refuse to aid China in her war with Japan? What attitude should we take toward belligerents in a war involving Canada or some Latin American state? Or will the administration remove the necessity of a neutrality proclamation by entering such conflicts at once? Or does the President propose to ignore the necessity of a proclamation on the technical ground that war has not been officially declared? The proponents are silent on these points. Wide divergence of opinion also exists as to the extent of the embargo. Only a few legalists take exception to an embargo of munitions and loans and credits. War materials, which include practically anything considered contraband by belligerents, may be treated in any one of four ways: "trade to be at the shippers risk; trade to be restricted to quotas based on normal exports; trade in at least the most significant items, such as cotton, iron, steel, coal, and oil to be embargoed;"<sup>15</sup> or we could lay a complete embargo. The first is only a slight modification of the present *laissez-faire* system and can in no way prevent dangerous outbursts of popular indignation in case such trade were destroyed. The second leaves room for the same international difficulties and would likely lead to further domestic complications. It is doubtful whether it could be successful unless the quota system be extended to all neutrals to prevent belligerents from receiving goods from other neutrals who do not have neutrality restrictions. The third offers most protection from involvement but will demand willingness to pay the price. The fourth, due to the unpleasant memory of Jefferson's Embargo Act of 1807, to our strong industrialism which demands foreign commerce, and to an hereditary antipathy to the renunciation of the doctrine of freedom of the seas is not likely to get even a hearing.

With these facts as to a proposed neutrality policy and the terms of the 1937 law before us we are now in a position to attempt an answer to our question, "can America be neutral?" We reply, yes, but on three conditions. First, we must be willing to accept some fundamental changes in our traditional foreign policy. One change likely to be forced

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<sup>15</sup>Bradley, *op. cit.*, p. 110.



upon us as a neutral nation is the lapsing or outright abrogation of the Open Door policy in the Far East. In the present Sino-Japanese war, it is becoming increasingly clear that we must drop the policy, adhere to it in principle but refuse to enforce it, or enter the war, for it is unlikely that China, singlehanded, can withstand Japanese aggression. We must also renounce or seriously modify our traditional policy of protecting lives and property abroad. And finally, we must surrender the century-old tradition of freedom of the seas. This latter step seems probable in view of the fact that the debate on the Pittman neutrality bill, which passed the Senate by a 63-6 vote on March 3, showed little sentiment for a continuance of the old doctrine of the freedom of the seas; but the Far Eastern war has caused considerable discussion on our trading rights, and sentiment seems to be growing in favor of our traditional policy.

The second conditional factor in our neutrality is the possibility of persuading our people to pay the price of neutrality. Non-intercourse will mean decreased foreign trade with resulting disturbances in the price levels and increased unemployment. Even with trade restricted to "normal peacetime levels", our people must be prepared to forego the otherwise possible huge war-time profits, accept regimentation of trade by quotas and industrial disorganization. In either case they must be prepared to see much trade, which they might have had under the old system, pass to the ports of other neutrals who do not limit their trade. And in the case of limited trade as in the World War, they must be prepared to see their goods destroyed or seized and some of their countrymen killed. This will be a part of the price, if neutrality legislation is to keep us out of war. If trade is allowed to be carried on as usual, we have no reason to believe the final result will be any different than in 1914-1917.

Let us turn these generalities into specific questions of fact. Will our people forego the profits accruing from the present Sino-Japanese conflict in order to remain neutral? Department of Commerce statistics show that Japan has purchased 355 per cent more iron and steel scrap, 189 per cent more refined copper, and 1755 per cent more copper from January to May in 1937 than for the same period in 1936. Figures for the same periods show China purchased 572 per cent more gas and fuel oil and 485 per cent more refined

copper in 1937 than in 1936. During the month of September, 1937, China took \$2,800,000 worth of munitions, while \$440,000 worth went to Japan. In addition to these shipments to the Far East there has been a marked increase in other exports of armaments. During August our aeronautical exports were 85 per cent higher than in July and 125 per cent higher than in 1936. Will our people surrender a part of this trade to insure neutrality?

If such sacrifices do follow the application of a neutrality policy, then the third condition of successful neutrality is that we must withstand ceaseless and seductive propaganda to persuade us to abandon our neutral position. Belligerents will scheme as in the World War either to bring us into the war or at least modify our neutrality. Our commercial and financial interests will cry out again for a right to carry on trade wherever and whenever they please; they will protest against a law which allows foreign competitors to monopolize wartime trade. These very cries were raised during the Italo-Ethiopian war embargo.<sup>16</sup> And today this propaganda is beginning to flourish in regard to the Far East. Japan has been branded as a treaty violator; China is pictured as a righteous host doing battle for civilization. We are told we should insist on our "rights" in the Pacific and in China; that neutrality really aids Japan in her war of conquest. With the aid of press and radio these appeals will have just as much effect as in 1917. The American people hate war, but it is a fair question to ask whether they are prepared to pay such a price for peace. Can our people be steeled against such propaganda by our government? Or more embarrassing still, is our government even attempting to explain its Far Eastern policy? If America would stay out of war the people must be made to see that the inevitable humiliations and inconveniences inherent in a neutrality policy, especially when great sea powers are among the belligerents, are more to be desired than a doubtful vindication of our legal neutral rights, which may lead us again into a fruitless foreign war.

In summary, then, can America be neutral? Yes, if we are willing to modify our foreign policy, persuade our people to pay the necessary price, and withstand the seductive wiles of war-time propaganda. But can these "ifs" be accomplished?

<sup>16</sup>Buell, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

Certainly the comparative ease with which the neutrality bills were enacted, the strong popular sentiment in favor of them, the growing power of the organized peace movement are all very encouraging. Nevertheless, we cannot be certain. The impossibility of foreseeing the exact conditions under which neutrality is to be applied, the increasing difficulty of isolation for a great industrial nation, the growing strength, if not actual bellicosity, of the military dictatorships, more dangerous to peace and democracy than the militarism of the German Kaiser ever was, the reluctance of the Roosevelt administration to invoke the neutrality law in the Sino-Japanese conflict, and the simultaneous insistence upon a policy of "watchful waiting",—all these raise serious doubts in my mind as to the success of a neutrality program.

We have not materially reduced economic barriers, we have not abandoned commercial imperialism, we have not removed irredentist groups; on the other hand, we have governments definitely committed to policies of expansion, by force if necessary, and we have larger and more deadly armed forces than ever. If all these things were causes of a world war in 1914, which eventually dragged America into its vortex, what is to prevent its recurrence under similar conditions?

There is danger that neutrality prove a delusion just as has the program of disarmament. Disarmament failed because it was based on the mistaken idea that the mere presence of armaments was the primary cause of war; that nations without armaments would not fight. So neutrality seems to be based on the false assumption that we entered the World War primarily because our heavy war trade was jeopardized, and hence to stay out of war we must stop or limit that trade. I fear this answer is too simple, and although I favor a neutrality policy, I have no misgivings as to its weakness. The road of neutrality in the past has been the road to war. The only sure way to keep out if war is to keep war out of the world, and that cannot be done simply by isolating ourselves and at the same time following policies of economic and military rivalry which led to the first World War.

Neutrality is worth a fair trial, but along with it must go a constructive program for removing international tensions and building international good will. Otherwise, neutrality may postpone, but is not likely to avert our involvement in war.

The Sino-Japanese undeclared war is the acid test for the neutrality law. The verdict will be a choice between commercial sacrifices under neutrality and the dangerous policy of insisting upon neutral rights. The verdict will be pronounced by the American people, probably in the near future.

## ACTIVITIES OF EARLY ARGENTINE AGENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

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That region of Hispanic America in which the revolution against Spain was most consistently successful was the one lying about the Rio de la Plata. It was to the "Government of Buenos Ayres" that Caesar A. Rodney, first minister sent by the United States to an Hispanic-American government, was accredited. This diplomatic event did not take place until 1823, but for more than a decade the authorities at Buenos Aires had been sending agents to Washington. The activities of those agents form a chapter of some interest in the history of United States-Argentine relations.

In the words of one of its leaders, the Argentine revolutionary government aspired early to "a close and intimate relation" with the United States.<sup>1</sup> With a view to developing that relation and obtaining firearms and other supplies—and encouraged perhaps by the arrival at Buenos Aires early in 1811 of Joel R. Poinsett, an agent of the North American government—the Argentine Junta of Government decided in 1811 to send a mission to the United States. The individuals chosen for it were Diego de Saavedra, son of the president of the Governing Junta, and Juan Pedro de Aguirre, secretary of the cabildo, or city council, of Buenos Aires. To avoid compromising the United States in any way in the eyes of England or any other nation, the envoys travelled under the names of Pedro López and José Cabrera.<sup>2</sup> In a letter of introduction President Saavedra stated that his government would take particular pleasure in establishing with the North American republic all kinds of mercantile relations.<sup>3</sup>

On October 25, 1811, the mission arrived at Washington where they sought an interview with Secretary of State

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<sup>1</sup>Gervasio Antonio de Posadas, Supreme Director of the United Provinces, to James Madison, President of the United States, March 9, 1814. Wm. R. Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations* (New York, 1925), I, 334.

<sup>2</sup>Cornelio de Saavedra and others to President Madison, June 6, 1811. Manning, I, 321.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*



Monroe.<sup>4</sup> In the interview Monroe, replying to a request that he furnish protection in the purchase of arms, expressed sympathy for the cause of the South Americans and gave the agents permission to go freely about the country in search of munitions. His government, he intimated, would not be able to go far in aiding them but he promised that everything that it could with propriety do to help, it would do with pleasure.<sup>5</sup>

As Stephen Girard, a contractor to whom the agents applied, lacked the requisite number of rifles, the government consented to sell him some eighteen to twenty thousand, thus proving the sincerity of Monroe's promise, while putting a strain on the country's neutrality. But, lacking funds, only a limited number of rifles were bought, and the envoys returned to Buenos Aires, arriving on May 19, 1812. The United States consul at that place reported that the effect of their mission was to cause the United States to be looked up to as "the only sincere friend of their cause not only by the Government but by the people."<sup>6</sup>

Shortly after the close of the War of 1812 the United Provinces sent a new agent to the United States, Martín Thompson. His appointment was made early in 1816, and he was chosen for the uncomplimentary reason that his personal qualities would not excite a suspicion that he was invested with so important a commission.<sup>7</sup> He was sent to implore "the protection and aid necessary for the defense of a just and sacred cause."<sup>8</sup> In the United States Thompson encountered agents from Venezuela, New Granada, and Mexico. He joined with them in scheming with Sir Gregor MacGregor the emancipation of Florida from Spain. By so doing he offended the Washington government, which also had a wishful eye on Florida, and he was shortly recalled.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>4</sup>Saavedra and Aguirre to Monroe, October 25, 1811. MS. Department of State, Legations of the Argentine Confederation and Buenos Ayres, I.

<sup>5</sup>Daniel Antokoletz, *Histoire de la Diplomatie Argentine* (Paris, 1914), pp. 201-205.

<sup>6</sup>W. G. Miller to Monroe, July 16, 1812. Manning, I, 326.

<sup>7</sup>Alvarez, Supreme Director, to Madison, January 16, 1816. Manning, I, 342.

<sup>8</sup>Norberto Piñero, *La política internacional argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1924), p. 48.

<sup>9</sup>Alberto Palomeque, *Orígenes de la Diplomacia Argentina; Misión Aguirre a Norte América* (Buenos Aires, 1905), I, 20, 31.

Having made, on July 9, 1816, an express declaration of independence of Spain, the United Provinces desired recognition of the new status. It was believed that the United States should be among the first to welcome the republic, hence a new agent was commissioned. This was Don Manuel H. de Aguirre. He appeared at Washington on July 19, 1817,<sup>10</sup> bearing commissions from the government of both the United Provinces and Chile. That from the former directed him to promote whatever would conduce to the cause in which the Provinces were engaged, promote their honor, and consolidate the work of their liberty.<sup>11</sup> The Chilean commission empowered Aguirre to procure two ships of thirty-four guns each for the navy of that country.<sup>12</sup> He was in addition provided by each government with twenty-five privateering patents and instructed to engage naval officers, offering them the salary which they would be paid in the American navy in time of war, and in addition fifty per cent of the proceeds from the sale of prizes which they might take.<sup>13</sup>

Arrived at Washington, Aguirre was confidentially received by President Monroe to whom he stated the objects of his mission. Monroe assured him that the North Americans and South Americans were friends, and that the United States sympathized with the cause of the South Americans. He warned him, however, that the government could offer only an indirect and secret protection.<sup>14</sup>

One of the subjects to which Aguirre gave attention was the neutrality law of March, 1817, which he declared to Adams in a note of December 29, bore heavily only on those who

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, I, 39.

<sup>11</sup>Manning, I, 351; Palomeque, I, 194.

<sup>12</sup>San Martín to Monroe, April 1, 1817. Manning, I, 352. To effect the purchase of the ships Aguirre was supplied with 100,000 pesos and was promised an additional sum within three months. He was authorized to borrow in the United States on Chile's account. If he could by this means secure sufficient funds, he was to procure four additional ships of eighteen to twenty-four guns. Gonzalo Bulnes, *Historia de la Expedición Libertadora del Perú* (Santiago de Chile, 1887), I, 42. It is to be remembered that at this time San Martín was preparing in Chile for the invasion of Peru.

<sup>13</sup>Bulnes, I, 42; Francisco José Urrutia, *Páginas de historia diplomática; los Estados Unidos de América y las repúblicas hispanoamericanas de 1810 á 1830* (Bogotá, 1917), pp. 58, 59.

<sup>14</sup>Bartolomé Mitre, *Historia de Belgrano, y de la independencia argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1887), III, 97, 98; Palomeque, I, 41, 42.

were struggling for the independence of Spanish America.<sup>15</sup> Whether because of Aguirre's protests or for other reasons, the law was replaced the following year by a new one that removed the discriminations concerning which complaint was made.<sup>16</sup>

Not long after his arrival in the United States Aguirre addressed a note to the president informing him of his government's declaration of independence and stating the reasons therefor.<sup>17</sup> This was followed in a few weeks by a communication to Secretary Adams in which he requested recognition of the Provinces as a free and sovereign state. His government, he said, believed

that the identity of political principles, the consideration of their inhabiting the same hemisphere, and the sympathy so natural to those who have experienced similar evils, would be so many additional reasons in support of his anxiety.<sup>18</sup>

Ten days later Aguirre addressed Adams again, elaborating the grounds on which recognition was asked. Improvement in the means of defense made it evident, he wrote, that Spain would be unable to reconquer its former provinces. The war in South America was a civil war, and the parties were worthy of being ranked among nations. Where the bonds of political compact between a sovereign and his people are broken, both have equal rights and owe the same obligations to neutral nations, therefore the contending parties in South America should not be subjected to different rules. If any exception were to be made, it ought to be made in favor of the oppressed against the oppressor. The Argentine agent intimated that the United States had shown indifference toward the cause of the South Americans. He closed by asserting his belief that the United States could not fail to give "an example of national justice" in acknowledging the independence of the United Provinces.<sup>19</sup>

In a conference with Aguirre a short time after the date of the communication described above, Adams mentioned the fact that the manner in which the United States had been recognized by France was by a treaty concluded with it as

<sup>15</sup>Manning, I, 366.

<sup>16</sup>*United States Statutes at Large* (Peters' ed.), III, 370.

<sup>17</sup>October 29, 1817. Manning, I, 357, 358.

<sup>18</sup>December 26, 1817. *Ibid.*, I, 362.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, I, 363-365.

an independent power in which every one of the states composing the Union was distinctly named. Adams thought something of the kind necessary in the acknowledgement of a new government and believed that some idea should be formed of the general extent of the country thus recognized. The country of which Aguirre desired acknowledgment was that which before the revolution had been the vice-royalty of the Río de la Plata. A matter complicating the question of recognition, said Adams, was the fact that the Banda Oriental (now Uruguay) and other parts of the previous vice-royalty did not recognize the authority of the government of the United Provinces.<sup>20</sup>

Aguirre seized on the suggestion of recognition by treaty. Though he confessed that the letter of his powers did not extend so far, he believed that the negotiation of a treaty would come within the object and spirit of his mission and declared himself willing to enter into negotiations on "the general basis of a reciprocal amity and commerce."<sup>21</sup> Adams, believing that Aguirre lacked the necessary authority, and feeling, moreover, that for various reasons it was not good policy for the United States to recognise any of the new states at that time, declined to negotiate.<sup>22</sup>

In his efforts to discharge that part of his mission which related to ships Aguirre met with some embarrassing and exasperating experiences. Shortly after he arrived in the United States he had a conference with Richard Rush, acting secretary of state, in which he informed him of his commission

to prepare in the Ports of the Republick (with the consent of the Government) armed vessels, capable of protecting the military Expedition, composed of ten thousand men, prepared at Santiago in Chile, destined for the capital of Peru.<sup>23</sup>

Aguirre wished to purchase some of the public ships of the United States but was informed that that was totally impossible as the United States was in the position of a neutral.<sup>24</sup> He was told that it was permissible for him, how-

<sup>20</sup>Adams to Monroe, March 25, 1818. *Ibid.*, I, 59, 60.

<sup>21</sup>Aguirre to Adams, January 6, 1818. *Ibid.*, I, 367, 368.

<sup>22</sup>Adams to Monroe, March 25, 1818. *Ibid.*, I, 59.

<sup>23</sup>Aguirre to Adams, November 14, 1817. MS. Department of State, Legations of the Argentine Confederation and Buenos Ayres, I.

<sup>24</sup>Statement of Richard Rush relative to conversation with Aguirre regarding ships, November 22, 1817. *Ibid.*

ever, to purchase arms and munitions of war from merchants. He was also informed that he was at liberty to purchase ships of any size from private individuals in ports of the United States but that "he must not arm, or in any way equip them for war." His attention was called to the act of congress recently passed adding new penalties for activities of that sort. Said Rush:

He was, in fine, told that he must move, while making his purchases or doing anything else, in the mere sphere of an individual; that so long as he did so, avoiding any breach of our laws, his conduct would be sanctioned and himself protected; and that if the cause of his country could be in this way benefited, I believed the people and government of the United States would be well content.<sup>25</sup>

Evidently interpreting the statements of Rush to mean that the government would wink at a violation of the neutrality laws by him,<sup>26</sup> or trusting in the popular enthusiasm for the South American cause to influence such a course, Aguirre arranged through the agency of a Mr. Davis to have two ships built and fitted out at New York.<sup>27</sup> The neutrality law permitted vessels of any size to be built in the country and sent out of it, provided they were not armed, or if armed, that the intent was not to employ them against a power with which the United States was at peace.<sup>28</sup> Aguirre's initial mistake, as Monroe somewhat querulously stated in a letter to Adams,<sup>29</sup> lay in communicating to the department of state his intention to contravene the law.

The Argentine fitted out the ships, was arrested for violating the laws of the United States, and actually spent four days in jail.<sup>30</sup> He was released when it was found impossible to prove that he had armed the ships.<sup>31</sup> Aguirre then, finding it, as he thought, impracticable to get the vessels out of Amer-

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup>Aguirre to Pueyrredón, 1817. Quoted in Palomeque, I, 207, 208.

<sup>27</sup>John M. Forbes, agent at Buenos Aires, to Adams, October 26, 1821. MS. Department of State, Consular Letters, Buenos Ayres, II.

<sup>28</sup>Monroe to Adams, August 17, 1818. Monroe, *Writings*, Hamilton, ed. (New York, 1901), VI, 64-66.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup>Bulnes, I, 48. Aguirre urged immunity from arrest on the score of diplomatic character, but Adams reminded him that as an agent he was in the United States in a non-diplomatic character. Adams to Aguirre, August 17, 1818. Manning, I, 76-78.

<sup>31</sup>Adams to Aguirre, August 27, 1818. Manning, I, 76-78.



ican waters, and put to an expense of a thousand dollars a day in caring for them, proposed to sell them to the United States.<sup>32</sup> The government declined to purchase, the president believing that he had no power to do so and that, if he had, to do so would be highly improper.<sup>33</sup>

Then, in an effort to clear the ships from the United States, Aguirre had them registered, to give them a mercantile appearance, in the names of his captains, Skinner and Delano. Whereupon, both ships were attached for personal debts of the captains.<sup>34</sup>

Fortunately for Aguirre, he was able at length, through the assistance of an American citizen, to get the ships away from New York. The cannon and other fighting equipment were removed from them and placed on merchant vessels which conveyed them to Buenos Aires where the vessels were put in fighting trim.<sup>35</sup> Thus both Aguirre and the government at Washington were extricated from an embarrassing situation.<sup>36</sup>

Though no official evidence of it has been discovered, Aguirre seems to have made some use of the privateering patents furnished him by the governments which he represented. A writer in the *National Intelligencer* of October 7, 1818, writing on issuance of commissions to privateers, warmly defended the action of South American agents in these activities, naming Aguirre.

Failing in that part of his mission which concerned recognition of his country's independence, and only partially successful in that which related to ships, Aguirre decided to

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<sup>32</sup>Aguirre to Adams, August 10, 1818. MS. Department of State, Legations of the Argentine Confederation and Buenos Ayres, I.

<sup>33</sup>Monroe to Adams, August 17, 1818. Monroe, *Writings*, VI, 64-66; Adams to Aguirre, August 27, 1818. Manning, I, 76.

<sup>34</sup>Adams to Monroe, August 12, 1818. MS. Library of Congress, Monroe Papers, *Writings to*, XVII, 2165.

<sup>35</sup>Palomeque, I, 69.

<sup>36</sup>The ships—*La Curiacio* and *La Horacio*—reached Buenos Aires in November, 1818. The first was incorporated in the Chilean fleet, according to the original intention, under the name *La Independencia*. (Bulnes, I, 51.) The second was sold by her captain to the Portuguese government at Rio de Janeiro, the reason alleged by the captain for his action being the failure of the Buenos Aires government to pay the crew and reimburse the captain for funds advanced by him. Palomeque, I, 69.

return to Buenos Aires. This he did on one of the ships which he had had constructed, reaching his home capital in November, 1818.<sup>37</sup>

Aguirre had been indiscreet and importunate. He found his designs impeded by the laws of the United States and he did not understand that the executive power, even though friendly to his cause, could not suspend their operation. He felt that the government had not played entirely fair with him. The effect of his experience would have been, perhaps, to compromise seriously the good feeling of the Platine provincials for the United States had it not been for the fact that while he was in the United States a commission from that country was making an official visit at Buenos Aires.<sup>38</sup> It may be said that Aguirre's mission was without diplomatic effect, though it did perhaps furnish some aid to Henry Clay and others in agitating the cause of the Hispanic Americans.

Early in 1818 David C. DeForest was appointed by Supreme Director Pueyrredón to be consul-general of the United Provinces in the United States.<sup>39</sup> Arriving at his post in the spring, he applied in May to Secretary Adams for an *exequatur*. It was refused.<sup>40</sup> In December he renewed his application.<sup>41</sup> Adams in his reply<sup>42</sup> again refused an *exequatur*, and in a conversation with the agent some days later explained that the act of accrediting him would be equivalent to a formal acknowledgment of the government that sent him.<sup>43</sup>

In his correspondence with DeForest, Secretary Adams brought up the fact that in an unauthorized "treaty" negotiated at Buenos Aires by an American agent, one W. G. D. Worthington, with the authorities of the United Provinces Pueyrredón, Supreme Director, had stated that the United Province reserved the right to grant special commercial privileges to Spain as an equivalent for the recognition of the colony's independence. Adams questioned whether under such reser-

<sup>37</sup>Palomeque, I, 69.

<sup>38</sup>See Watt Stewart, "The South American Commission, 1817-1818," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, IX, 31-59.

<sup>39</sup>Halsey to Adams, February 25, 1818. MS. Department of State, Consular Letters, Buenos Ayres, I.

<sup>40</sup>Adams to Rush, minister to Great Britain, January 1, 1819. Manning, I, 85-88.

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, I, 515, 516.

<sup>42</sup>December 31, 1818. *Ibid.*, I, 82-85.

<sup>43</sup>DeForest to Adams, January 8, 1819. *Ibid.*, I, 518.

vation independence could be considered complete. He declared that the United States had no intention "of exacting favors of Buenos Ayres for the acknowledgment of its independence," but asserted that in acknowledging it it would expect to enjoy such privileges and advantages as were enjoyed by other foreign nations.<sup>43</sup> DeForest was unable to make on this point an explanation satisfactory to the secretary of state.<sup>44</sup>

Secretary Adams made complaint to DeForest of the activities of Buenos Airean privateers.<sup>45</sup> The agent was caused "much mortification" and promised to inform his government of the complaint, but rather adroitly inquired what he could do. He had been sent to the United States as consul-general, but without a recognition of his powers he had no right to question any individual on his conduct. Nor did he think that any responsibility for the irregularities committed could attach to him or to his government during the continuance of the existing state of affairs.<sup>46</sup>

Informed of the reasons for non-recognition of DeForest, the government at Buenos Aires promised that his commission should be revoked,<sup>47</sup> but it was not until March of 1823 that the promise was fulfilled.<sup>48</sup>

Before that date the Washington government had decided on recognition of the several independent Hispanic-American states, the United Provinces of South America included. Despite the vigorous efforts put forth by Aguirre, it can scarcely be said the work of these agents hastened the date of recognition. The substance of the reports of agents of the United States in Hispanic-America—of John M. Forbes at Buenos Aires,<sup>49</sup> for example—detailing military successes of the revolutionists, and the altered international situation were, instead, the factors influencing recognition. The most that

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<sup>43</sup>Adams to DeForest, December 31, 1818. Manning, I, 517.

<sup>44</sup>DeForest to Adams, January 8, 1819. *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup>January 1, 1819. *Ibid.*, I, 88, 89.

<sup>46</sup>DeForest to Adams, January 8, 1819. *Ibid.*, I, 516-519.

<sup>47</sup>Minutes of a conference of Rivadavia, secretary of state of the United Provinces, and John M. Forbes, September 17, 1821. MS. Department of State, Consular Letters, Buenos Ayres, II.

<sup>48</sup>Argentine Republic, *Documentos para la Historia Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1921), XIV, 202, 203.

<sup>49</sup>See Watt Stewart, "The Diplomatic Services of John M. Forbes at Buenos Aires," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XIV, 202-218.

can be said of the work of the agents of the United Provinces is that it encouraged the growth of privateering by citizens of the United States and furnished to friends of the revolutionists materials for agitating the cause of the Hispanic Americans.

## EUROPE'S EFFORTS AT PEACEMAKING DURING THE TURCO-ITALIAN WAR

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The Italian government could not have dreamed of a more favorable occasion for the initiation of its armed aggression against Turkey for the possession of Tripoli<sup>1</sup> than that which presented itself in September, 1911. Public opinion, excited by the nationalists and the bankers and by a long period of tension with Turkey over the apparent discrimination against every Italian enterprise in the North African territory, was almost unanimous in favor of such action. The Franco-German crisis over Morocco and the prospect that both powers would increase their African possessions had produced a strong demand in Italy for compensation and intensified the long felt fears of many Italians that some other power, perhaps France, Germany, or England might acquire Tripoli. Italy's financial condition was excellent;<sup>2</sup> her army was prepared;<sup>3</sup> she had, in fact, reached maturity as a great state. Abroad the situation was equally favorable, for all of the great European states had given Italy assurances which amounted to an undated check for Turkey's last possession in North Africa.<sup>4</sup> Interested as they were in winning the friendship of Italy, none of the powers raised a restraining hand, although Germany and

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<sup>1</sup>Tripoli includes the two Turkish provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.

<sup>2</sup>E. Payen, "La situation économique et financière de l'Italie", *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, XXXIV (Sept. 16, 1912), 328-336.

<sup>3</sup>G. Giolitti, *Memoirs of My Life* (Storer trans., London, 1923), pp. 270, 271.

<sup>4</sup>A. F. Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914* (Paul and Myers trans., London, 1921), I, 113, 227-229, 233; II, 44-81, 114-142; *Documents diplomatiques Français, 1871-1914* (Paris, 1929-31), (2) I, 22, 23; (2) II, 390, 408; *Il libro verde: Accordi Italo-Francesi, 1900-1902* (Rome, 1920), pp. 1-4; *Entente Diplomacy and the World. Matrix of the History of Europe, 1909-1914* (Siebert and Schreiner eds., New York, 1921), p. 161; J. L. Glanville, *Italy's Relations with England, 1896-1905* (Baltimore, 1934), pp. 107-123; *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914* (Gooch and Temperley eds., London, 1933), I, 287-291. Hereafter cited as B. D.



Austria had worked for more than a year to iron out difficulties between their Italian ally and their Turkish friend.<sup>5</sup>

An alleged danger of a native uprising was the pretext used by Italy to justify her demand to Turkey, September 28, 1911, for the right to occupy Tripoli. Turkey's reply was conciliatory. She would meet any demands of Italy which did not involve the territorial integrity of Tripoli.<sup>6</sup> Italy, however, declared war on the following day.

Thus Europe was faced with a new crisis, the seriousness of which no one could predict. The reaction of opinion in England, Germany, and Austria was in general unfavorable, since it was believed that the war might upset the Balkan cauldron, inflame the Mohammedan world, and lead to even more serious consequences. French opinion, influenced, no doubt, by the cordiality of relations with the Latin sister since the beginning of the century, was more favorable to Italy.<sup>7</sup> The immediate interest of the powers was to restrain the Balkans. In this they were at first successful, although it soon became evident that if Turkey were weakened the Balkan states would take up arms to achieve their national aspirations.<sup>8</sup> Italy's promise that she would do everything in her power to localize the war to those areas which did not threaten the peace of the Balkans was considered a hopeful sign.<sup>9</sup>

Under such circumstances the powers turned toward means of restoring peace. Any policy was bound to be one of extreme caution. Neither European group could afford to antagonize Italy. If she were driven openly into the arms of the Triple Entente it might well encourage aggressive ambitions on the

<sup>5</sup>*Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914. Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes* (Lepsius, Bartholdy, Thimme eds., Berlin, 1922-27), XXX, 3-8, 12-15. Hereafter cited as G. P. *Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914. Diplomatischer Aktenstücke des Österreichisch-Ungarischen Ministeriums des Aussern* (Bittner, Pribram, Srbik, Uebersberger eds., Vienna, 1930), III, 12, 13, 97, 98, 106, 107 and *passim*. Hereafter cited as O. U. A.

<sup>6</sup>*La Libia negli atti del parlamento e nei provvedimenti del governo* (E. Pagliano ed., Milan, 1912,) II, 379-383.

<sup>7</sup>A discussion of the reaction of public opinion in Europe, based on the available newspapers in the Library of Congress, is given in chapter III of my unpublished thesis.

<sup>8</sup>G. P., XXX, 56, 57, 64, 85, 86; O. U. A., III, 352, 353, 358, 362, 370-375, 379-381, 389, 400-402; B. D., IX, 281, 283, 284, 295, 297.

<sup>9</sup>Jagow to Foreign Office, Sept. 30, 1911: G. P., XXX, 69-70.

part of that group; if the solidity of the Triple Alliance were affirmed by something more tangible than words it could only be viewed as a rebuff for France, England, and Russia. The question of the future balance of power in Europe was definitely at stake.

At first it seemed possible that Italy would be reasonable about peace terms. A suggestion by the Turkish ambassador in Berlin for a lease of Tripoli to Italy proved unacceptable to San Giuliano, the Italian foreign minister, when it was forwarded to Rome by Germany. However, San Giuliano informed both Germany and Austria that a tenure in Tripoli like that of Austria in Bosnia prior to 1908 might be accepted.<sup>10</sup> Turkey, frightened by the turn of events, was anxiously considering various proposals for ending the war, one of which was to constitute Tripoli as an autonomous province with a governor-general elected by the powers and confirmed by the Sultan.<sup>11</sup> The problem, of course, was to find some settlement which would give Italy effective control of the provinces but which would save Turkey's face by a general acknowledgement of her sovereignty.

This favorable situation for the conclusion of peace encouraged a rivalry among the powers for the honor of mediating. France, represented by Selves, her foreign minister, favored a common plan of action by the Entente in order to prevent Germany from improving her position at Constantinople.<sup>12</sup> The Entente was willing enough to discuss common action, although Grey, the British foreign secretary, thought that mediation was premature, and Russia was cautious lest she offend Italy. Early in October the members of the Entente sounded Italy as to mediation only to be told that eventual mediation by Germany was desired.<sup>13</sup> Kinderlen-

<sup>10</sup>Note by the Editors, *G. P.*, XXX, 80; Jagow to Foreign Office, Oct. 3, 1911; *Ibid.*, XXX, 88, 89. Austria informed Turkey, Oct. 5, of this unofficial suggestion for settlement. Aehrenthal to Rome, Berlin, and Constantinople, Oct. 3, 1911; *Ibid.*, III, 394.

<sup>11</sup>Marschall to Foreign Office, Oct. 4, 1911; *G. P.*, XXX, 90-92.

<sup>12</sup>Demidow (Russian *chargé* in Paris) to Neratov (acting foreign minister), Oct. 3, 1911; *Der diplomatischer Schriftwechsel Iswolskis 1911-1912* (F. Stieve ed., Berlin, 1926), I, 154.

<sup>13</sup>Grey to Lowther, Sept. 30, 1911; *B. D.*, IX, 287; O'Beirne to Grey, Oct. 1, 1911; *Ibid.*, IX, 204; Neratov to London and Rome, Oct. 1, 1911; *Graf Benckendorffs diplomatischer Schriftwechsel* (B. v. Siebert ed., Berlin, 1928), II, 173; Jagow to Foreign Office, Oct. 13, 1911; *G. P.*, XXX, 105; Kinderlen-Wachter's memorandum, Oct. 16, 1911; *Ibid.*, XXX, 112.

Wachter, the aggressive German foreign secretary, had, in fact, attempted to assume the lead in mediating, a role for which Germany was well suited because of her close relations with both belligerents. Apparently, Italy favored mediation by Germany alone, but Kiderlen-Wachter informed Austria, October 4, that he desired to coöperate with her in the matter.<sup>14</sup> He failed, however, to inform Italy that Austria would participate until October 13.<sup>15</sup> Such action was, to be sure, displeasing to Austria.

As the war progressed and the Italians captured the important coastal towns of Tripoli, which the Turks had, in fact, decided not to defend, a change of feeling took place in Italy. The country became victory mad. Insignificant victories were magnified into glorious feats of arms. There was an ever increasing demand in Italy for outright annexation.<sup>16</sup> Turkish opinion also stiffened after the first wave of fear and, especially, after it became evident that the Italians were unable to advance into the interior of Tripoli. The powerful Committee of Union and Progress not only opposed the surrender of any territory, but it also favored the initiation of an economic boycott against Italy and the expulsion of Italians living in Turkey.<sup>17</sup> Turkey's proposal of October 8, addressed to the powers, reflected this changing attitude. It provided for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Italy and a recognition of Italian demands which corresponded with the actual situation, with the reservation that Turkey's sovereignty must be maintained.<sup>18</sup>

Such a proposal naturally found no favor in Rome. Although he was not personally opposed to the nominal sovereignty of Turkey, the Italian foreign minister emphasized to Jagow, the German ambassador, that the Tripolitan question must be settled for all time. The surgeon's operation, he said, must be complete, and his conclusion was that no decision over peace terms could be reached before Tripoli was actually

<sup>14</sup>Jagow to Foreign Office, Oct. 3, 1911; *Ibid.*, XXX, 88, 89; Flotow to Aehrenthal, Oct. 4, 1911; *O. U. A.*, III, 390.

<sup>15</sup>Mérey to Aehrenthal, Oct. 14, 1911; *Ibid.*, III, 433, 434.

<sup>16</sup>Jagow to Bethmann Hollweg, Oct. 7, 1911; *G. P.*, XXX, 97-99.

<sup>17</sup>*Matin*, Oct. 9, 1911; Pallavicini to Aehrenthal, Oct. 6, 1911; *O. U. A.*, III, 413.

<sup>18</sup>*G. P.*, XXX, 95, 96, 102, 103; *O. U. A.*, III, 413.

occupied by Italian troops.<sup>19</sup> By October 13 the Italian government had resolved on an unyielding stand, for San Giuliano told the German ambassador that outright annexation must be demanded. Italy would accept the spiritual overlordship of the Caliph and show herself conciliatory in other matters, as, for example, the payment of an indemnity.<sup>20</sup> When Assim Bey, the Turkish foreign minister, was informed by Germany of Italy's insistence upon annexation, he replied that he would rather leave wife and children and enlist in the war than to negotiate on such a basis.<sup>21</sup>

Turkey, in desperation, was vainly trying to find some power to support her case by something more than meaningless words. In a secret session of parliament, Said Pasha, the Grand Vizier, threatened, October 18, to turn to the other group of powers if Germany and Austria failed to bring about a settlement. This was more than threat, for Tewfik Pasha, the Turkish ambassador in London, signified to Grey, October 31, that Turkey was ready to discuss the formation of an Anglo-Turk alliance or Turkey's participation in the Triple Entente. His purpose was obviously to obtain England's aid in maintaining Turkish sovereignty over Tripoli. The English Cabinet refused to sacrifice Italian friendship by an agreement of this nature, and therefore, Grey informed Turkey, November 2, that England could not enter upon such conversations until peace was concluded.<sup>22</sup>

While matters were reaching this impasse, Aehrenthal, the Austrian foreign minister, who had been greatly irritated by Germany's attempt to take the lead in mediating, proposed to the powers, October 20, 21, that all should act together to restore peace. This would prevent either Italy or Turkey from playing off one group of powers against the other. It would save any one power or group of powers from incurring the displeasure of Italy or Turkey, and it would prevent either group from gaining all the honor and prestige from successful

<sup>19</sup>Jagow to Foreign Office, Oct. 9, 1911. *G. P.*, XXX, 103, 104.

<sup>20</sup>Jagow to Foreign Office, Oct. 13, 1911. *Ibid.*, XXX, 105, 106.

<sup>21</sup>Marschall to Foreign Office, Oct. 16, 1911; *G. P.*, XXX, 113, 114.

<sup>22</sup>Marschall to Foreign Office, Oct. 19, 1911; *Ibid.*, XXX, 120, 121; Communication from Tewfik Pasha, Oct. 31, 1911; *B. D.*, Appendix iv, 779; Grey's minute, Oct. 31, 1911; *Ibid.*, IX, iv, 780; Grey's memorandum, Nov. 2, 1911; *Ibid.*, IX, iv, 780.

mediation.<sup>23</sup> The suggestion was in general accepted by the powers, although the German foreign minister was not at all pleased at Austria's forwardness.<sup>24</sup> All were willing to have their ambassadors in Constantinople report on Turkey's conditions for peace.<sup>25</sup> But Turkey's victories in Tripoli (October 23-26), which encouraged the Porte to remain firm,<sup>26</sup> and Italy's unyielding stand on the sovereignty question, climaxed by the annexation of Tripoli (November 5), formed a situation which precluded any effective action by the powers unless they were willing to exert pressure upon one or both of the belligerents.<sup>27</sup> Only Russia favored exerting pressure on Turkey;<sup>28</sup> no state was willing to risk the displeasure of Italy.

The Turks were not agreed upon any possible solution. Said Pasha, the Grand Vizier, favored a conference composed of the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin. He was unwilling, however, to agree to a conference which included in its program the acceptance of Italy's annexation of Tripoli, and it was evident that Italy would reject a conference which would not. No doubt it would be easier for Turkey to accept the loss of Tripoli if this were imposed by a united Europe; but a conference was dangerous, for the Cretan question and other problems might come up. Other Turkish suggestions, none of which Italy would possibly accept, were: the cession of the coast or all of Tripolitania to Italy, with Cyrenaica remaining in Turkish hands; the exchange of Tripolitania for Eritrea; an autonomous government for the provinces; the cession of both provinces to the Sheik of Senussi.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>23</sup>Aehrenthal to Szogyeny, Oct. 20, 1911; *O. U. A.*, III, 456-458; Aehrenthal to Berlin, Constantinople, and Rome, Oct. 23, 1911; *Ibid.*, III, 470, 471; Aehrenthal to Fürstenburg, Oct. 28, 1911; *Ibid.*, III, 490, 491; Aehrenthal to London, Petersburg, and Paris, Oct. 21, 1911; *Ibid.*, III, 463, 464; Cartwright to Grey, Oct. 23, 1911; *B. D.*, IX, 312, 313.

<sup>24</sup>Szogyeny to Aehrenthal, Oct. 21, 1911; *O. U. A.*, III, 462.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, III, 485, 491-498; *G. P.*, XXX, 139, 140.

<sup>26</sup>G. Ramaciotti, *Tripoli. A Narrative of the Principal Engagements of the Italian-Turkish War During the Period 23 October 1911, to 15 June 1912* (London, 1912), pp. 1-8.

<sup>27</sup>Pagliano, *La Libia*, II, 400-403. This decree was occasioned by the fear that the powers might attempt mediation on some other basis than annexation. Laroche to de Selves, Nov. 7, 1911. *Documents diplomatiques Français*, (3) 1, 47. Hereafter cited *D. D. F.*

<sup>28</sup>See p. 10.

<sup>29</sup>*D. D. F.*, (3) I, 92, 93, 378, 379, 410, 422; E. Jackh, *Kiderlen-Wachter der Staatsmann und Mensch* (Berlin, 1935), II, 174-176.



Italy, faced with an impatient public opinion, yet unable to occupy the provinces effectively, was seeking some way out of the blind alley into which the annexation decree had led her. Attempts in November to enter into direct negotiations with Turkey through the Rumanian secretary of legation in Constantinople met with no success.<sup>30</sup> The Austrian foreign minister was probably correct in thinking that Italian threats to extend the war to the Aegean or perhaps to the Straits in November and December were for the purpose of frightening the Porte and causing the powers to bring pressure to bear upon Turkey,<sup>31</sup> since the threatened naval action was postponed until 1912.

The danger of Balkan complications, if the war continued until the spring of 1912, was the ever present menace which forced the powers to continue to seek for peace. After his return to Russia in December from taking the cure in Switzerland, Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister, became greatly alarmed over this danger. He was also anxious to win the gratitude of Italy. Therefore, he took up the idea of an armistice and assumed the lead in an effort to bring about mediation.<sup>32</sup> From December 19 to its final failure with Turkey's negative answer, April 23, 1912, the Sazonov plan was constantly before the European foreign offices. Europe finally accepted it in modified form, but no one had much hope that it would succeed. Even France and England did not wholeheartedly accept the Russian minister's proposals. The plan, which curiously enough Sazonov first confided to the German and Austrian ambassadors, was for an armistice, with both Italy and Turkey withdrawing their troops from Tripoli. Italy would remain in possession, but Turkey would be spared the humiliation of a formal cession.<sup>33</sup> He frankly told O'Beirne, the British *chargé*, December 25, that a "friendly but very serious pressure" should be exerted by Europe collectively.<sup>34</sup>

Grey had little sympathy for the plan of exerting pressure

<sup>30</sup>Fürstenburg to Aehrenthal, Nov. 17, 1911; *O. U. A.*, III, 557.

<sup>31</sup>Aehrenthal to Mérey, Nov. 15, 1911; *Ibid.*, III, 551, 552.

<sup>32</sup>On November 25 Grey had sounded France and Russia on a proposal to have Turkey entrust her case to the powers who would appeal to Italy for an armistice. *B. D.*, IX, 333.

<sup>33</sup>Pourtalès to Bethmann Hollweg, Dec. 19, 1911; *G. P.*, XXX, 259, 260; Thurn to Aehrenthal, Dec. 21, 1911; *O. U. A.*, III, 716, 717.

<sup>34</sup>Buchanan to Grey, Dec. 26, 1911; *B. D.*, IX, 352.

upon Turkey, but he was willing to consider this policy, provided all the powers participated.<sup>35</sup> Sazonov's suggestion that France should act for the powers was generally unacceptable. Germany might use this, declared the French foreign minister, in order to stir up mistrust for France in Turkey. De Selves, in fact, suspected that Tittoni, the Italian ambassador in Paris, was behind the whole scheme and even feared that he was working for an understanding between Russia, Austria, and Italy for something like a Balkan alliance with Germany's support, which might disturb the existing diplomatic alignment to France's disadvantage.<sup>36</sup> The ambassadors in Constantinople agreed that something more than diplomatic pressure would be necessary in order to secure the acceptance of the Sazonov proposal by Turkey.<sup>37</sup> France had no desire to be the goat.

The visit of Kiderlen-Wachter, the German foreign secretary, to Rome, January 20-22, 1912, aroused some hope that peace might be nearer and occasioned some suspicion of Germany's activity. Eight days earlier, Assim Bey, the Turkish foreign minister, had announced to Germany that he was ready to have the Sultan renounce his sovereignty over the coast of Tripolitania and appoint a Bey, who could enter into the same relations with Italy as the Bey of Tunis with France; but Turkey, he insisted, must retain the hinterland.<sup>38</sup> Kiderlen-Wachter, however, found that Italy held fast to the annexation decree and that there was no suitable basis for mediation.<sup>39</sup>

On January 27 Sazonov addressed a new circular to the powers. He was not attempting to provoke immediate mediation, he declared, but rather to have the powers agree in principle so that they might act at an opportune moment. It might be necessary to exert pressure to end the war. As a first point he wished to establish whether the powers were

<sup>35</sup>Grey to Buchanan, Dec. 29, 1911; *Ibid.*, IX, 353.

<sup>36</sup>Aehrenthal to Szögyény, Jan. 4, 1912; *O. U. A.*, III, 743, 744; Isvoiski to Sazonov, Jan. 3, 1912; *Schriftwechsel Isvoiskis*, II, 18; Bertie to Grey, Jan. 3, 1912; *B. D.*, IX, 356, 357.

<sup>37</sup>Marschall to Bethmann Hollweg, Jan. 7, 1912; *G. P.*, XXX, 268-271; Marschall to Foreign Office, Jan. 7, 1912; *Ibid.*, XXX, 266, 267; Pallavicini to Aehrenthal, Jan. 8, 1912; *O. U. A.*, III, 757, 758; Bompard to Poincaré, Jan. 17, 1912; *D. D. F.*, (3) I, 489.

<sup>38</sup>Zimmermann to Jagow, Jan. 12, 1912; *G. P.*, XXX, 279, 280.

<sup>39</sup>Kiderlen-Wachter to Foreign Office, Jan. 22, 1912; *Ibid.*, XXX, 537-539.

disposed to recognize the necessity of "*une action pacifatrice commune*" in case the course of events became threatening to the peace of Europe.<sup>40</sup> None of the powers objected to discussing a hopeless and therefore innocuous proposal for mediation. Following a suggestion by Grey that the powers should secure a mandate from Turkey for mediating and for the establishment of a basis of negotiations with Italy,<sup>41</sup> Sazonov submitted an *aide-memoire* to Buchanan, the British ambassador, February 21, suggesting that the powers should ask Italy for her minimum terms. They might then be in a position to indicate certain advantages which might serve as compensation for the eventual withdrawal of Turkish troops from Tripoli and which might induce the Porte to entrust its interests to the powers.<sup>42</sup> England and France preferred that the *démarche* should be made at both capitals simultaneously, but, in the interest of Entente solidarity, they accepted the Russian proposal.<sup>43</sup> On March 9, 1912, the ambassadors accredited to Italy asked for her minimum terms on which she would accept the mediation of the powers.<sup>44</sup> Italy gave her written reply March 15. She demanded full and complete sovereignty over Tripoli, but recognition of this by the powers, even without Turkey's, would suffice. Turkey must withdraw her soldiers and establish the *status quo ante bellum* with regard to Italian subjects in the Turkish empire. Italy would compensate Turkey for the loss of government property in Tripoli and assume Tripoli's share of the public debt. The religious authority of the Caliph would be recognized in Tripoli. Turkey could make its own customs regulations, abolish foreign post offices and the capitulations, as soon as the other European powers had likewise given their consent.<sup>45</sup>

It was obvious that Turkey would not consent to the Italian conditions unless forced to do so by the powers. Nevertheless, Europe continued to discuss the next step in order to give

<sup>40</sup>O. U. A., III, 798, 799.

<sup>41</sup>P. Cambon to Poincaré, Feb. 3, 1912; D. D. F., (3) I, 598, 599.

<sup>42</sup>Buchanan to Grey, Feb. 21, 1912; B. D., IX, 367, 368.

<sup>43</sup>Poincaré to P. Cambon, Feb. 23, 1912; D. D. F., (3) II, 79; P. Cambon to Poincaré, March 1, 1912; *Ibid.*, (3) II, 124; Poincaré to P. Cambon, March 3, 1912; *Ibid.*, (3) II, 138, 139; Grey to Rodd, March 4, 1912; B. D., IX, 371.

<sup>44</sup>Jagow to Foreign Office, March 9, 1912; G. P., XXX, 310, 311; Mérey to Berchtold, March 9, 1912; O. U. A., IV, 39.

<sup>45</sup>B. D., IX, 378-380; O. U. A., IV, 47, 48.

Sazonov's proposal an honorable burial. Sazonov favored advising Turkey to invoke the mediation of the powers,<sup>46</sup> but he took up a suggestion by Grey that Turkey should be asked for the conditions on which she would terminate the war.<sup>47</sup> The démarche was made April 16, and Turkey gave her answer April 23. The mediation of the powers was accepted, but Italy must withdraw not only her sovereignty decree but also her soldiers.<sup>48</sup> Thus ended the first and only major attempt to bring an end to the war by international co-operation. Realizing that peace was for the moment impossible, Italy had already extended her naval operations and intensified the war in Tripoli.

The powers did not entirely give up hope of peace, but rather turned again to separate negotiations with the consequent revival of mutual suspicions. If they had centered their attention more on peace and less on improving their respective relations with the belligerents, the result would, no doubt, have been different.

After Italy's naval expedition into the Straits in April had aroused a storm of protest in European opinion, there was some indication that she was preparing to modify her demand for absolute sovereignty in Tripoli.<sup>49</sup> Faced with the prospect of naval action, not only in the Aegean, but also at Constantinople, Turkey was also more favorable to making her peace. The foreign minister even suggested, May 9, that the powers must dictate peace terms; otherwise the conclusion of peace would give rise to internal complications.<sup>50</sup> The Grand Vizier favored a division of Tripoli,<sup>51</sup> but the *Tanin*, which supposedly expressed the views of the Committee of Union and Progress, demanded (May 19) that the war should be continued until Tripoli had been restored to Turkey.<sup>52</sup> In May the idea of a conference received considerable attention from

<sup>46</sup>Pourtales to Bethmann Hollweg, March 14, 1912; *G. P.*, XXX, 315, 316.

<sup>47</sup>Grey to Bertie, March 21, 1912; *B. D.*, IX, 383; Bertie's note, March 21, 1912; *D. D. F.*, (3) II, 242, 243.

<sup>48</sup>*G. P.*, XXX, 334, 335; *D. D. F.*, (3) II, 384-386.

<sup>49</sup>Benckendorff to Sazonov, April 30, 1912, *Benckendorffs Schriftwechsel*, II, 259.

<sup>50</sup>Mutius to Foreign Office, May 9, 1912. *G. P.*, XXX, 425; Mutius to Bethmann Hollweg, May 9, 1912. *Ibid.*, XXX, 426, 427.

<sup>51</sup>Bompard to Poincaré, May 15, 1912. *D. D. F.*, (3) III, 11-14.

<sup>52</sup>*Matin*, May 19, 1912.

the European foreign offices, but since it was in general regarded with disfavor nothing tangible came from these discussions.<sup>53</sup>

The shift of Marschall von Bieberstein from Constantinople to London as German ambassador in June only increased the fear of France and Russia that Germany, aided perhaps by England, would take the lead in an effort to bring about peace.<sup>54</sup> The nervous Poincaré, who was now directing foreign policy in France, was even fearful that Germany and Russia might act together, especially in view of the meeting of the German Emperor and the Russian Tsar at Baltic Port in July. His apparent suspicion of Russian intentions irritated Sazonov.<sup>55</sup>

It was Austria, rather than the much suspected Germany, that was most active in June in an effort to bring about a cessation of the war. No doubt the main aim of Berchtold, the Austrian foreign minister, was to abbreviate Italy's occupation of some fourteen islands in the southern extremity of the Aegean sea, and thus to relieve friction between Rome and Vienna. His eye was also on the ever threatening Balkan situation. On June 1 he suggested a scheme to Turkey whereby she would turn over Cyrenaica to the Khedive of Egypt and Tripolitania to the Bey of Tunis. Through Austria's mediation, England and France, acting for Egypt and Tunis respectively, would transfer the provinces to Italy. This was unacceptable to Turkey, but it was Berchtold's main purpose to show the Porte the danger of delay in concluding peace.<sup>56</sup> The division of the provinces or independence under an Arab Bey who could make terms with Italy appeared to the Turkish foreign minister to be possibilities. The transmission of these projects to Italy won an expression of gratitude to Austria from the Italian foreign minister and some favor for the idea of independence.<sup>57</sup> A mutiny in the Turkish army and the resulting

<sup>53</sup>*D. D. F.*, (3) III, 17-19, 22, 30, 41, 42, 45, 46, 49-54, 63, 73; *O. U. A.*, IV, 202, 203; *G. P.*, XXX, 431-433.

<sup>54</sup>*B. D.*, IX, 395, 396, 400, 401; *D. D. F.*, (3) III, 131-133; *Benckendorffs Schriftwechsel*, II, 364-376.

<sup>55</sup>*B. D.*, IX, 396-411; *D. D. F.*, (3) III, 92-172; *Schriftwechsel Iswolskis*, II, 142-148.

<sup>56</sup>*O. U. A.*, IV, 191, 192, 205, 216, 224.

<sup>57</sup>*Ibid.*, IV, 218-220, 231.



fall of the Said Pasha cabinet, July 17, made it impossible to continue these discussions.

Already Italy had established direct contact with Turkey through Volpi, an Italian with important connections in Turkey. Nogara, a representative of the *Commerciale d'Oriente*, continued these conversations and negotiations were started at Lausanne, Switzerland, July 12. Due to the chaotic political situation in Turkey, they were suspended, July 28.

A new non-Committee government, with Ghazi Mukhtar Pasha, the venerable Turkish warrior, as Grand Vizier and Gabriel Effendi Noraghourdian, a Christian, as foreign minister, was more favorable to the conclusion of peace. The bellicose chamber was dismissed on August 5, and negotiations with Italy were resumed eight days later. The Turkish counter proposals and demands were too numerous to be mentioned here. The significant fact is that the war clouds were rapidly gathering in the Balkans in August and September. Bulgaria and Serbia, with Montenegro and Greece as willing partners, were preparing to cash in on their alliance. A Balkan war might have serious consequences if Italy, as a great power, were at the same time at war with Turkey. Turkey was anxious for peace in order to devote her attention to the greater menace from the Balkans. Both Italy and Turkey were concerned over the effect of peace terms upon public opinion. Italy invited the powers to press upon the Turks the need of yielding. Such advice was, in fact, given repeatedly by Germany, Austria, France, and Russia.<sup>58</sup> Even England unofficially advised Turkey to yield after the declaration of war by Montenegro, October 8.<sup>59</sup> Italy warned Turkey that naval operations, which had for some time been suspended, would be resumed unless peace had been made by October 15.<sup>60</sup> Turkey signed the treaty on that date.

Italy wisely consented to yield the form in order to keep the substance. The real peace treaty was secret. Turkey was able to save her face by declaring Tripoli autonomous. However,

<sup>58</sup>G. P., XXX, 456-461, 472-478; O. U. A., IV, 300, 301, 384, 423, 424, 577; D. D. F., (3) III, 513, 532; Benckendorffs *Schriftwechsel*, II, 466; *Schriftwechsel Iswolskis*, II, 286.

<sup>59</sup>Grey to Lowther, Oct., 12, 1912. B. D., IX, 425.

<sup>60</sup>Jagow to Foreign Office, Oct. 7, 1912. G. P., XXX, 472.

Italy issued a decree mentioning her sovereignty and the powers speedily recognized this.<sup>61</sup>

Europe realized from the first that this long and dangerous war might cause the Balkans to burst into flames. However, the powers refused to intervene energetically to force the acceptance of a moderate peace. They were too busy trying to improve their relations with the belligerents, especially Italy. Mutual mistrust between Triple Entente and Triple Alliance prevented Europe from agreeing on any practical scheme of action. Europe passed from this crisis to the graver one of the Balkan wars, while Italy continued her efforts to conquer the natives on the sands of Tripoli.

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<sup>61</sup>For a convenient French text of the treaties see *B. D.*, IX, 438-442. England was the last great power to recognize Italian sovereignty, October 25.

## NOTES FROM THE SOUTHWEST

Although certain persons at each institution have kindly consented to supply the editors of the *Quarterly* with news items concerning research projects completed or in progress, promotions in rank, and other information concerning their colleagues in the social sciences, contributions to this department are welcomed from any member of the Association who may have news items to report from time to time.

### ARKANSAS

*University of Arkansas*—A Bureau of Public Affairs has been established at the University of Arkansas to act cooperatively with the Arkansas League of Municipalities in conducting research and formulating policies of municipal administration. Henry A. Ritgerod, formerly associated with the Missouri State Planning Board on studies in government and public finance is to be in charge of this organization. He takes the place of Mr. Charles Fisher who died suddenly last November.

Mr. Orville J. Hall, Assistant Professor of Rural Economics, has taken leave of absence for two months during the spring in order to continue work toward his doctors degree at the University of Minnesota.

Mr. H. W. Blalock, formerly Associate Professor of Rural Economics, has announced his resignation from the University faculty effective January 13. He will continue in his present position on the State Utilities Commission.

### LOUISIANA

*Louisiana Polytechnic Institute*—At the recent Louisiana Teachers' Association meeting in Shreveport Professor G. W. McGinty was reelected president of the Social Science Section for another year.

### MISSOURI

*Central Missouri State Teachers College*—Dr. W. E. Morrow, who was Dean of the College and Head of the Department of Economics and Commerce at Central Missouri State Teachers College, died last summer. He had served the institution for many years and was regarded as an outstanding teacher and

a fine scholar. Professor Clay J. Anderson has been promoted to the head of the Department of Economics and Commerce.

Dr. F. W. Calvert, Head of the History Department, attended the School of International Relations conducted at the University of Michigan last summer.

*University of Missouri*—Dr. Lewis E. Atherton, Instructor in History, has been granted a fund by the Research Council of the University, to be used in gathering documents on Missouri history for the University Library and the State Historical Society of Missouri.

Mr. Melvin W. Sneed, Acting Chairman of the Department of Rural Sociology, has accepted an appointment as Director of the Division of Research and Statistics of the State Social Security Commission of Missouri, the appointment becoming effective January 1.

Dr. Noel P. Gist, Assistant Professor of Sociology, has been appointed Acting Chairman of the Rural Sociology Department for the remainder of the year.

Dr. Noel P. Gist has been appointed chairman of the Committee on Social Research of the Mid-West Sociological Society. Other members of the committee are Dr. E. W. Burgess, University of Chicago, Dr. C. D. Clark, University of Kansas, Dr. E. L. Kirkpatrick, University of Wisconsin, Dr. T. Earl Sullenger, University of Omaha, and Dr. Stuart Queen, Washington University.

Dr. C. T. Pihlblad, Associate Professor of Sociology, has been appointed a member of a commission to conduct oral examinations for the selection of probation officers in Missouri.

Dr. J. Q. Adams, Assistant Professor of Geography, read a paper on "Arctic Bay, Baffin Island" before the Association of American Geographers at their annual meeting at Ann Arbor, Michigan, December 30, 1937.

During the summer of 1938 Dr. Adams plans to make a survey of a colony of Italians who have made a success of grape growing on the alleged unproductive ridge lands of the northern Ozarks in Missouri.

Dr. Sam T. Bratton, Professor of Geography, is preparing an article on geographic problems along the Pacific coastal areas of Caribbean America.

Mr. Henry A. Ritgerod, formerly a graduate assistant in political science and more recently associated with the Missouri State Planning Board became chief of the Bureau of Municipal Research of the University of Arkansas and Research Consultant of the Arkansas Municipal League on February 1, 1938.

Dr. David Fellman of the University of Nebraska, department of political science, will teach in the University of Missouri during the summer session.

Professor O. R. Johnson attended the Illinois Farmers Week as one of the guest speakers of its program. His speech delivered January 12, was entitled "The Corn Belt Farmers and the Changing Economic Order".

Mr. Donald Ibach, extension economist, is the author of two recently published extension circulars, "New Farming Systems Applied to Southwestern Missouri Uplands", Circular No. 370; and "Replanting Missouri Farms", No. 375.

Dean F. B. Mumford and Professors O. R. Johnson and Conrad H. Hammar of the Missouri College of Agriculture, Mr. R. J. Silkett of the Farm Security Administration, and Mr. E. A. Mayes of the State Planning Board and the Missouri Department of Conservation attended the National Conference on zoning sponsored by the National Resources Committee held in Chicago, January 10-11.

Mr. R. J. Silkett, state land use planning specialist of the Farm Security Administration, is chairman of the committee to arrange the program for the section on agriculture for the forthcoming meeting of the Missouri Academy of Science to be held at the Missouri School of Mines in Rolla, April 22 and 23, 1938.

The Works Progress Administration recently assigned ten clerks to the Missouri Land Use Planning Section, Farm Security Administration, to further research in land utilization and aid in the initiation of area analysis and land classification studies in several Missouri counties. The project is sponsored by the Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Missouri.

#### NEW MEXICO

*University of New Mexico*—Professor George P. Hammond, head of the history department, and Dr. Dorothy Woodward, a member of the history department, attended the annual



session of the American Historical Association at Philadelphia.

Dr. Benjamin Sacks of the history department has completed an article entitled "Sir Oswald Mosley and British Fascism," which has been published in the November, 1937, issue of the *New Mexico Quarterly*.

#### TEXAS

*West Texas State Teachers College*—Miss Darthula Walker, Head of the Department of Geography, has an article, "Adjustments to the Climate of the Llano Estacado Region of Texas", in the *Yearbook* of the Association of Pacific Coast Geographers, Vol. 3, 1937.

#### GENERAL

The Fourth Annual Southern Social Science Research Conference, sponsored by the Social Science Research Council, was held at the St. Charles Hotel, March 10-12. The general topic for the meeting was "Problems and Methods in the Study of Population". For the purposes of discussion, the general subject was divided into the following subdivisions: history, population changes and government, and population changes and social security. Thirty-three representative social scientists from the Southern states participated in the discussions.

## BOOK REVIEWS

EDITED BY O. DOUGLAS WEEKS

University of Texas

Ball, M. Margaret, *Post-War German-Austrian Relations: The Anschluss Movement, 1918-1936*. (Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 1937, pp. ix, 304.)

Miss Ball has presented the first comprehensive treatment in English of the movement for the union of Germany and Austria from its beginning to the Austro-German agreement of 1936. The study is based on an examination of laws, treaties, parliamentary and other speeches, all available published documents, monographs, articles, and a large number of newspapers. The material was obtained largely from the Hoover War Library and the University of Cologne. Certain important protocols are reproduced in an appendix. An extensive bibliography and a good index are useful.

As a result of the unfortunate events connected with and following the World War, Austria lost all hope of a livable future. Only a small part of her 32,369 square miles of mostly mountainous territory was arable. Most of her factories were now in Czechoslovakia, and she was surrounded by a high tariff wall. Common racial and cultural ties between the six million German Austrians and Germany and the hope of economic salvation gave impetus to a movement which had already developed during the war for some form of union. Steps were taken by both countries in preparation for full political union. However, the victorious powers gave what amounted to an absolute veto of the *Anschluss* by forcing Austria and Germany to agree in the peace treaties that the independence of Austria was inalienable, except with the consent of the League Council.

Following the peace treaties, there was considerable agitation in several of the provinces for withdrawal from the Austrian Republic, and an overwhelming sentiment for union with Germany. Nevertheless, Austria agreed in the Geneva Protocols of 1922 that her political independence would be preserved and that she would not violate her economic independence by granting to any state a special regime or exclusive advantages calculated to threaten this independence. This was the price Austria paid for certain essential loans.

From 1922 to 1926, Austria was too busy with financial reconstructions and Germany was too busy with reparations, Ruhr occupation, and inflation to take any official steps toward the *Anschluss*. The movement was confined to popular demonstrations and semi-official expressions of opinion, to the alarm of other powers. Methods of cultural and legal coöperation were being worked out by Germany and Austria. In fact, the trend in Germany was now toward economic rather than political union.

Germany worked for more cordial relations with France from its admission to the League of Nations, September, 1926, to the death of Stresemann, October, 1929. Therefore, no official move was made toward union other than work toward identical legal systems. The numerous pro-*Anschluss* demonstrations during the period are adequately discussed.

Briand's proposal for a United States of Europe, first announced in the Autumn of 1929, was received favorably by the Austrian and German governments. As a first step toward the formation of a European Customs Union, Germany and Austria announced their intention to form a customs union, March 21, 1931. The Vienna Protocol of March 19 provided that Germany and Austria should have tariff laws of the same content, although both states reserved the right to modify their tariff laws and to conclude commercial treaties with third powers. Other interested states might adhere. The union was to be for three years and might be terminated on one year's notice. The plan met with considerable opposition from other governments, especially France and Czechoslovakia, and was referred to the League Council, which in turn referred it to the World Court. Two days before the Court rendered its decision, grave financial crises in Germany and Austria convinced the governments that French good will and credits were more valuable than the customs union. Therefore, the union was formally abnegated, to the mutual disgust of the press of both countries. By a vote of eight to seven, the World Court held that the customs union would be a violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1922.

With the advent of Hitler in 1933, the tide has apparently turned, for the supporters of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, plus the Socialists, have decided against union with Nazi Germany. Apparently the Austrian groups favoring union with Germany numbered about forty per cent after the Nazis gained control of Germany. The struggle against the Nazis, climaxed by the failure of the *Putsch* in which Dollfuss was assassinated in July, 1934, are described mainly from the formal indictment drawn up against Germany by Austria and from newspaper reports. Since that time the Schuschnigg government has made a determined effort to stamp Nazism out of the national life.

Austria has drawn closer to Italy and Hungary since the Rome Protocols of 1934 and 1936 laid the basis for consultation and economic coöperation. Mussolini has stood solidly behind Austrian independence. France and England likewise joined Italy at Stresa in 1935 in asserting that the independence of Austria inspired their common policy. This announcement came when German rearmament caused fear that Germany might attempt to take Austria.

Austro-German relations have improved since 1934, although reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 caused fear in Austria that Germany might attempt to force her into union at some future date. The answer of the Schuschnigg government was the denunciation of the military clauses of the treaty of St. Germain and the introduction of conscription. The *Anschluss* movement was at least temporarily shelved by the Austro-German agreement of July, 1936, whereby Germany recognizes the complete sovereignty of Austria and promises not to interfere in her internal affairs, in other words not to encourage the Austrian National Socialists.

Although a final study of Austro-German relations cannot be written until some future date when the archives are opened, this clear presentation of the *Anschluss* problem is of great value. Miss Ball has presented a commendable piece of work from the available evidence. One wonders whether sentiment in Germany and Austria was ever quite unanimous for

union as indicated in this volume. Perhaps more emphasis on the reaction of European opinion outside Germany and Austria would have made this a still more valuable study.

WILLIAM CLARENCE ASKEW

University of Arkansas

Hall, Walter Phelps, and Albion, Robert Greenhulgh, with the collaboration of Pope, Jennie Barnes, *A History of England and the British Empire*. (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1937, pp. vi, 999).

The publication of a new college text in history usually is justified by its author on the ground of a new interpretation, a more practical approach, a changed emphasis, or a more inclusive content. Unfortunately, however, the promise so implied is not always fulfilled, with the result that one is inclined to approach every text in a spirit of skepticism so far as its alleged purpose is concerned.

The authors of the volume under review tell us that their aim is "a clear and fresh interpretation" and a more adequate consideration of "the imperial, social, economic and literary phases" of British history. It is indeed pleasing to observe that the aim has remained fixed and the purpose has been constantly kept in view, and much material of considerable interest and importance for a better understanding of our contemporary civilization, found usually in more specialized accounts, or gleaned from the original records themselves, has been included. The regular survey, century by century, of social classes, tracing their expansion or contraction, describing their distinguishing characteristics and explaining their differences, and the statistical tables showing the periodical growth of commerce, trade, taxation and population are illustrated. One wonders, however, why the statistics on the area, population and commerce of the British Empire were not carried beyond 1911. The changes since the Great War would have been very illuminating.

The volume is a collaborative venture. The chapters on pre-Norman history and on developments since the Napoleonic wars are largely the contributions of Professor Hall, and the intervening chapters, the bibliography, maps, tables and diagrams, the contribution of Professor Albion. Both are associated with the history department of Princeton University. Jennie Barnes Pope prepared the index.

The book is a ponderous volume with almost a thousand pages. About three-fourths of the space is devoted to the modern period, the detail naturally increasing as the present approaches. There are no marginal headings nor are the chapters broken up into units.

Among the commendable features of the book, in addition to those already referred to are: the excellent discussions of the results of the economic revolution, the formation of the new empire, and nineteenth century British thought; the unique but effective, black and white map arrangements illustrating the growth or contraction of British territory in various regions; and the keen and convincing analysis of the causes of the

Great War, which incidentally, effectively explodes the fiction that Britain came into the war because of the German invasion of Belgium.

On the other hand there are a few features which may be adversely criticized. Chapter titles have occasionally been prepared not so much with a view to chapter contents as to some rather far-fetched alliteration, e. g., "Danes and Dooms" and "Common Law and Crusading." Supplementary reading lists have not been placed immediately after the chapters, but a classified list of titles has been appended at the end of the book. The reviewer has found the first of these devices the more effective of the two in stimulating further investigation. Some conclusions seem to be unwarranted. So the implication that the British displayed a greater capacity "to take punishment" and "keep their chins up" during the Great War than did the Russians, the Germans or the French is hardly justified in view of the fact that "the punishment" imposed upon the three continental powers was considerably greater than that to which Britain was subjected.

There are also several assertions of doubtful validity. So it is not quite correct to call Caesar's first invasion of Britain "a failure," since it was never meant to be more than a reconnaissance; so also, the East India Company as chartered by Elizabeth was not a joint stock company as the unwary reader would imply from page 330, but a regulated stock company. It did not become a joint stock company until the seventeenth century had well advanced. The statement (p. 901) that "India [was] soon to become self-governing in fiscal matters" although literally true conveys the entirely wrong impression that the Indian people become self-governing in fiscal affairs. So also, the statement (p. 24) that "by the time of Augustine and his monks no one questioned that Rome was the head of the church or that the Pope was its leader," is much too broad.

It is to be regretted that no attention has been given to the growth of paleolithic civilization and that the theory of the successive invasion of the plains of Britain by Goidelic and Brythonic Celts has been retained, a theory which has been discarded by Peate, Collingwood and other leading authorities who advance an entirely different explanation for the distribution of the P and O Celts. Furthermore, the index is somewhat too restricted for a textbook. One looks in vain for Ralph Fitch, Richelieu, Hindenburg, Brest-Litovsk, Esquire, Separatist all mentioned in the text. Jamestown and Gibraltar are there but not Calcutta; Wei hai wei but not Ré. But, these after all, are minor and excusable defects in view of the magnitude of the work. A much more serious fault, but one that can be easily remedied, is the failure to list in the table of contents, the maps, charts and statistical tables. Their usefulness is thus greatly limited.

On the whole, however, the work is a credit to both the authors and the publishers. It deserves a position among the very best texts in the field, and will probably be widely adopted.

MILTON R. GUTSCH

University of Texas

Webb, Walter Prescott, *Divided We Stand, The Crisis of A Frontierless Democracy*. (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1937, pp. ix, 239).

Professor Webb has scored again. He has the very happy gift of seizing upon a thesis that should be apparent to all and developing it in



such a way as to produce something new, scintillating, and stimulating. *The Great Plains* filled a void which had long been felt by historians and social scientists. *Divided We Stand* comprehensively fills a similar void. The thesis, stated simply, is that the nation is divided into three sections, the North, South, and West. In this sectionalism the North has acquired ascendancy through government bounties (the tariff, civil war pensions, and patent monopolies) and has used that ascendancy to reduce the other sections to a vassalage which is made all too clear by the author's inexorable logic. There has developed in this country a feudalism in which the two sections which are larger and more copiously endowed by Nature are subjected to the control of corporate barons. The modern American feudalism differs from the medieval European feudalism principally in that (1) the American vassal does not possess the meager but certain status of his medieval prototype, (2) the modern baron (corporation) does not accept duties and responsibilities for the well-being of the vassal, and (3) the corporate barons have, through a sympathetic reception by the Supreme Court, been accorded all the privileges and immunities which were guaranteed to natural persons because the founding fathers of our nation feared an arbitrary government.

Professor Webb does not attempt to prove that every northerner is a member of the privileged ruling class, but simply that as a section the North has the advantage, because bank deposits, the ownership of natural resources located in the South and West, and other evidences of wealth are centered in the North. Northerners of the agrarian and laboring classes have the advantage over southerners and westerners only in that their proximity to the feast makes it more likely that they will get some of crumbs which fall from the festive board. Space will not permit a discussion of the many illustrations used to prove the case.

The concept embraced in the subtitle of the book, "The Crisis of a Frontierless Democracy," plays a large part in the development of its thesis. The frontier was always an escape valve for those who, in the absence of the frontier, must inevitably be reduced to serfdom. The economic overlords of America must contend with a problem which did not confront their medieval precursors, namely, they must justify themselves before a politically democratic nation. They were called to their first accounting in the campaign of 1896, but the financial and political wizardry of Mark Hanna combined with the fact that the industrial revolution had not yet run its course postponed the day of reckoning. A further postponement was brought about by the World War and by the invention and development of the automobile and the motion picture. These inventions opened up a great field for individual labor and they "almost overnight . . . took practically every loafer off the streets . . . and even made inroads on the domino players." Finally our economic overlords were called to a reckoning in 1932 after the debacle of 1929. Whether the New Deal has effected or will effect an adjustment of the system is not the point: the point is that the New Deal was ushered in and has the continuing support of the people for this purpose.

Professor Webb's conclusions are not so satisfying as is the body of the book. He allows his fancy to run riot by suggesting that we be

realistic and reorganize our governmental institutions so as to reflect actual conditions, with a chief executive and a senate chosen by the two hundred largest corporations and a second house selected by lesser business; thus the old feudalism would be reproduced and a system of status subject to the caprice of the barons would supplant the present social insecurity for which the ruling group accepts no direct responsibility. It is obvious that the author has his tongue in his cheek; if he means this suggestion, as he admittedly does, to illustrate the sorry plight to which we have come, then it should be used in the indictment rather than in the summation before the jury. It does not answer the question, "Is There a Way Out?" At the end the reader has a feeling that many of the tantalizing problems raised in the book have not been answered. Perhaps this is expecting too much.

The book is delightfully written. Dr. Webb's style is forthright and clear. His dry wit in many passages is itself worth the price of the book. *Divided We Stand* is "must" reading for all social scientists and is practically that for every American.

JOE M. RAY

North Texas State Teachers College

Hamilton, Walter H., and Adair, Douglas, *The Power to Govern: The Constitution, Then and Now*. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1937, pp. 254).

For years, the Supreme Court has painstakingly and laboriously sought to establish and maintain two distinctions with regard to the meaning and scope of the commerce clause. The first involves the difference between those types of legitimate business activity which are commerce, and those which are not, for purposes of regulation by Congress under the commerce clause; the second, the distinction between interstate and intrastate commerce. While there may be some justification for the latter in a government organized on the federal plan, there is little or nothing about either that bears any relation to the conditions of the modern world.

*The Power to Govern* is concerned with these and other questions of interpretation. The approach is historical and is based upon the very realistic assumption that men are governed by words. If this be true, then it becomes a matter of first importance to determine, by a study of the derivation and changes of meaning of the words, what they have meant in the past and what they mean now. To approach the analysis of such a problem as the nature of the commerce power through the channel of lexicography is as interesting as it is unusual.

The book has seven chapters; the first, on the appeal from the gloss to the text, lists numerous cases in which the court has exempted from regulation various types of business activity. The second sketches the familiar steps involved in the early stages of the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy up to 1787; the movement for the meeting of the commercial problems of the time, resulting finally in the gathering of the "young men at Philadelphia" who framed the Constitution—men who "became statesmen—without ceasing to be moneyed men." The discussion of the language of the Fathers shows clearly, by reference to the

then current dictionaries, the meaning of the various terms relating to trade and commerce. The latter word was broad and inclusive, and carried from an early date, a considerable prestige value. "The age knew only two ways of making a living, the direct application of labor to land, and the making and exchange of wares. In the world of the Fathers the agricultural economy of self-sufficiency and the commercial, or the moneyed, economy stood in sharp contrast. In their minds, the boundaries of commerce extended to the frontiers of the domestic economy." (Pp. 58-59). The Fathers—Englishmen born—accepted the prevailing English usage, which was continued in 1818 by Noah Webster in the first English dictionary published in America.

Until long after the Convention, the power of the state to regulate was taken for granted; there were differences with regard to policy, "but the principle of the subordination of individual and corporate activities to the wealth of the nation was not seriously disputed." (Pg. 69). Extensive consideration is given to the growth of political and economic theory, affecting the interpretation of the word "commerce,"—the idea of the laws of nature; mercantilism, both at home and abroad; Franklin's and Jefferson's ideas of the superiority of an agricultural society; Adam Smith and laissez-faire; and the usage in the debates of the Convention, where there was extensive discussion of taxation as a means of regulation. By painstaking phrasing and fitting, the important clauses of the Constitution, including the one on commerce, were shaped. In Chapter VI, the authors trace the effort to form an American economy through the familiar debates of the Convention, and in the ratifying conventions of the states, as well as in the contemporary literature—especially, Hamilton's *Report on Manufactures*. The powers of the new central government were not mere "grants;" they were "weapons which might be used singly or in concert as political occasion demanded" for purposes of protection, and for the development of a national economy. "All such powers were part and parcel of the national authority over commerce." (Pp. 180-181).

The concluding chapter contains a clear statement of the current liberal point of view regarding the interpretation of the Constitution, with special reference to the commerce clause. All of the chapters are supported by copious citations of sources, and explanatory footnotes (Pp. 195-246). The work is not only timely; it is exceedingly well done, and should take its place in that select list of standard titles on American government with which all students are expected to be familiar.

W. BROOKE GRAVES

Temple University

Murdock, George Peter (Ed.), *Studies in the Science of Society*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937, pp. xxii, 555).

This volume is the outgrowth of a desire on part of the numerous students and followers of Dr. Albert Galloway Keller to honor him upon his completion of thirty years service as professor of the science of society in Yale University. Even if the book did no more than present the long list of contributors, it would testify to the wide influence of Professor Keller.

Included in the list are many who have earned high positions in the field of social science. To have them acknowledge his leadership must be a source of great satisfaction to Professor Keller; to others it brings further proof of the worth to sociology of a man who began his career under the handicap of succeeding Sumner. For to succeed the author of the single sociological classic hitherto produced in America and to measure up to the consequent expectations requires a man of more than ordinary caliber. That Professor Keller has achieved greatness in his own right is convincingly demonstrated through his followers in the book under review.

The broad interpretation of the field of sociology, current in the Yale department, is reflected in the twenty-six contributions. As illustrative of the variety of subjects the following titles are quoted: "Minority Caricatures on the American Stage," by Harold E. Adams; "Basic Realities in a System of Unemployment Benefit," by E. Wight Bakke; "The Pattern of Urban Growth," by Maurice E. Davie; "Shamanism in China," by Edwin D. Harvey; "Freedom of the Press: Services of a Catch Phrase," by Alfred McClung Lee; "The Fur Trade Frontier of Siberia," by Theodore C. Weller; "The Pre-Iroquoian Cultures of New York State," by Carter A. Woods. So diverse are the articles that no one reader can properly judge them as to quality. To the reviewer many seem excellent, though nearly all suffer more or less from the necessities of brevity. All make significant contributions.

It is most unfortunate that in the procedure of library cataloguing as ordinarily practiced the names of the writers and the subjects they have treated will soon be lost under the uninformative title, "Studies in the Science of Society," edited by George Peter Murdock.

CARL M. ROSENQUIST

The University of Texas

Sabine, George H., *A History of Political Theory*. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937, pp. xvi, 797.)

The writing of a comprehensive history of the development of political thought from the Hellenistic *Alteitum* to the present is an ambitious task. To succeed as well as has Professor Sabine is indeed an intellectual triumph. Within a single volume, he has traced, in clear scholarly fashion, the developments from the Greek Sophists to modern dichotomy between Communism and Fascism.

Scholars in political theory will naturally differ as to the proper emphasis that should be placed upon a single movement or a single political philosopher. For instance, I agree with the prominent place which Professor Sabine gave to St. Thomas of Aquinas, but I feel as though Machiavelli is unduly stressed. The author starts his discussion of the national state period with a close description of the Machiavellian doctrine. I have never been able to decide as to whether the Florentine pragmatist was the last of the mediavalists or the first of the moderns.

On the whole, I feel as though the author has slighted the Sixteenth Century. The *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos* is over-emphasized, while Calvin, the fortuitous forger of the techniques of the democratic state, is given

scant attention. The intemperate John Knox and the Politiques are only briefly mentioned. The latter comprised some of the finest minds in the West, including the great Montaigne. The Madgeburgian preachers are ruthlessly omitted. Yet, Jean Bodin, who really sought no more than an ideological escape from the schisms of his period, is paraded through an whole chapter of excellent discussion.

On the other hand, the author has devoted more than an hundred pages to English political theory in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Much of the material is historical, but his treatment of the left-wing movements of the Cromwellian period is splendidly ample.

The Nineteenth Century is almost barren except for the discussions on Hegelianism, Utilitarianism and Marxism. Where are the great anarchists—Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, Stirner, Kropotkin, and Tolstoy? Where are the Catholic reactionists—de Maistre, de Bonald, and Lammenais? Spencer and Thomas Hill Green are given short notice but, generally, individualism is sadly neglected while great emphasis is placed upon the collective theories of Hegel, Marx, and modern Fascism.

CORTEZ A. M. EWING

University of Oklahoma

Buck, Paul H., *The Road to Reunion, 1865-1900*. (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1937, pp. xv, 320.)

The first two chapters deal with the bitterness of "Victory" and "Defeat". Many unkind words were spoken at the close of the war, some of which the author quotes. The writings of Bledsoe (South) and Draper (North) and the failure of the churches to unite are taken as the basis of "There Is No Peace, 1865-1880". Throughout this period politics was a powerful factor for continuing the division, the "bloody shirt" being waved by candidates ranging from constable to President. Grant may have meant well in his "Let us have peace", but he did little to bring it about; L. Q. C. Lamar did more with his eulogy of Sumner. Economic and social forces were the most important forces for breaking down dividing barriers. "Young Men Growing Up" had their eyes set on the future, not on the past. Professor Buck properly gives the Southern writers considerable credit for bringing the two sections to a better understanding of each other. He says:

For better or for worse Page, Harris, Allen, and their associates of the South, with the aid of Northern editors, critics, magazines, publishing houses, and theaters, had driven completely from the Northern mind the unfriendly picture of the South implanted there in the days of strife. In place of the discarded image they had fixed a far more friendly conception of a land basically American and loyal to the best traditions of the nation, where men and women had lived noble lives and had made heroic sacrifices to great ideals, where Negroes loved "de white folks", where magnolias and roses blossomed over hospitable homes that sheltered lovely maids and brave cadets, where romance of the past still lived, a land where, in short, the nostalgic Northerner could escape the wear and tear of expanding industry and growing cities and dwell in a Dixie of story-books which had become the arcady of American tradition.



The mind of the veterans was somewhat slow to open, largely because the politicians, both North and South, found the bitterness of war and Reconstruction an easy spring-board to office. The author regards the issue as closed by the Spanish-American war when former Confederates entered the army of the United States. He might have added that some of the churches held out much longer.

Professor A. M. Schlesinger, to whom the work is dedicated, considers that "The book is a brilliant performance". The reviewer believes this to be extravagant praise. Although the author has made good use of an enormous amount of source material and has his topics well arranged, the book is not faultless in English. (For example see quotation given above; also page 10.) But it is a book well worth writing and will be helpful to teachers of American history covering this period.

DAVID Y. THOMAS

University of Arkansas

Brown, Francis J., and Roucek, Joseph S., (Editors), *Our Racial and National Minorities, Their History, Contributions, and Present Problems*. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1937, pp. xxi, 877.)

The remark once made by Charles Lamb that we cannot hate anyone we know is certainly true in its application to race prejudice. The cure for race prejudice, therefore, is a better acquaintance between the races. Only through an intelligent appreciation of the culture of one race by another is it possible for each to assimilate what is best in the culture of the other.

This book is immensely valuable because it gives a fuller statement of the facts in reference to our immigrant stocks than has been hitherto available. It is therefore an indispensable source of information for the study of the influence of racial and cultural contacts. The authors of the book have been assisted in its compilation by thirty-nine American scholars, each assigned to write of the racial group of which he is a representative or has special knowledge. The chapters on the numerous racial groups, written by the authors and by their scholarly assistants, are not only very interesting but for the most part very fascinating. The story of the struggles and triumphs of these minority peoples abounds in the finest examples of heroism.

The chief aim of the book is to develop a sympathetic understanding and wholehearted appreciation of the heritage and contributions of each minority group. The book admirably fulfills its purpose and thereby renders a great service to the American people. It concludes with a chapter dealing with the national minorities in Central Europe, showing how the racial and cultural problems there contrast with those in America, and pointing out that a solution of the problems is to be found only in a democratic form of government in which mutual respect and equitable policies prevail between the majority and minority groups.

JEROME DOWD

University of Oklahoma

Carr, Robert K., *State Control of Local Finance in Oklahoma*. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1937, pp. 269.)

The major portion of this study is devoted to the state agencies of control rather than the local governments which are controlled. In this procedure the author has evidently followed the pattern of Oklahoma legislation, which makes little effort to distinguish between cities, counties, and school districts. The first eight chapters discuss in order the problem and background, legislative control, control of assessment, control of budgeting, control of local indebtedness, control of accounting and auditing, and control through grants-in-aid. The ninth and final chapter presents the author's conclusions regarding the situation.

Although Oklahoma was admitted to the Union in 1907 as the forty-sixth state, it seems that little advantage was taken of the experiences of other states in determining the proper relations between state and local governments. No summary of the author's detailed description of the various agencies of control can be presented here. In general, control is exercised through a number of overlapping agencies and has no "single central aim or underlying purpose." (p. 250.) The system is further described as complex without being comprehensive. In the author's opinion the "healthy legitimate needs of local units" have not been recognized. (p. 251.)

Perhaps the author is at his best in describing control as it actually works out. For example, the folly of expecting local officials to develop good budgeting merely by furnishing prepared forms is aptly illustrated by a comment attached to the budget of a small Oklahoma town. The town clerk had written "Don't know the '1932 tax in process of collection' and plenty of other things in this is Greek to me." (p. 222.) Many such revealing quotations and descriptive incidents are presented throughout the study.

The author recommends the merger of existing agencies in a unified department of local finance manned by appointive experts and limited to control over the administrative phases of local finance. Further, it is recommended that the department sponsor cooperative, friendly relations with local officials by furnishing advice and assistance, and by avoiding coercion.

This reviewer does not agree with all the thoughts and conclusions presented in this volume, but he recommends it to students of state and local relations. The description of state agencies of control "in action" is believed to be particularly worthwhile.

H. C. BRADSHAW

Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas

Brooks, Robert R. R., *When Labor Organizes*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937, pp. 361.)

In "When Labor Organizes", Professor Brooks has given us a well-balanced, lucid and comprehensive survey of the pattern of labor organization. Demonstrating an impressive command of the factual material, he approaches the subject of unionism with calm detachment and proceeds

to fit into his picture of the labor movement all the elements which have lately attracted so much popular attention—counter-espionage, labor racketeering, sit-downs, employee-representation, injunctions, the check-off, labor organizers, and so on. His description of the technique of unions extends from the activity of the initial group of small importance to the great centralized organization with its elaborate headquarters and vast responsibilities, from the simple demands for improved conditions to the application of pressure to compel compliance. He does not allow himself to become excited at the spectacle of unions, in an effort to obtain a greater share of industrial output for their members, resorting to methods as determined as those which employers use to retain their gains.

He leaves for his final chapter on "The Labor Movement in an Evolving Society" direct judgment on its capacity to attain the goal of ideal distribution of a maximum output of goods and services. In a field where the day-by-day developments quickly cause works to become outdated, Professor Brooks has written a book that deserves wide reading. Skill in exposition coupled with considered use of essential materials should assure him that audience.

SIMON G. HANSON

University of Louisville

Hutchinson, William T. et al, *The Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1937, pp. 417.)

It is altogether fitting and proper that scholars and teachers receive some remembrance while living. Several scholars such as H. E. Bolton, W. E. Dodd, C. H. McIlwain and others, have been honored recently with a book of essays written by their former students. The twenty-one essays in American historiography were written by twenty-one ex-students of professor Jernegan "as an expression of their friendship and esteem, \* \* \* at the time of his retirement from the History Faculty of the University of Chicago after nearly thirty years of fruitful service". The authors were members of his seminar in historiography where they were introduced to a critical appreciation of leading works in United States history.

This group of essays deals with representatives of several types of historians ranging from Bancroft to recent date. The chief works of the historians selected—George Bancroft, Richard Hildreth, Francis Parkman, Hermann E. von Holst, James Schouler, Woodrow Wilson, John B. McMaster, John Fiske, James F. Rhodes, Henry Adams, Alfred T. Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, Frederick J. Turner, Herbert L. Osgood, Edward Channing, George L. Beer, Clarence W. Alvord, Claude H. Van Tyne, Ulrich B. Phillips, Albert J. Beveridge, and Vernon L. Parrington—have been examined. The purpose was to ascertain their methods of research, the influences determining their outlook upon the past, and the reasons justifying their remembrance by students of American history.

The editor has done a nice job of unifying the work of the twenty-one authors of the essays. The essays are a worthwhile contribution to American historiography and should stimulate interest in such courses in graduate

schools of history. For the most part the essays are concise, critical, and show thorough research and sound interpretation. The numerous citations placed at the bottom of the page add to the value of the volume. It should find a place in the library of every student of American history.

G. W. MCGINTY

Louisiana Polytechnic Institute

Mosher, William E., and Kingsley, J. Donald, *Public Personnel Administration*. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936, pp. xiii, 588.)

The rapid increase in the number of books, pamphlets, and articles devoted to personnel administration within recent years is indicative of a growing conviction among students of government that the personnel problem is the central one in governmental administration. Although a voluminous literature now exists, official and otherwise, from which data may be obtained concerning almost every aspect of public personnel administration both in this country and abroad, part of it is virtually inaccessible to many interested in the problem. Furthermore, the attempt at scientific personnel management in governmental administration is a recent development, especially in the United States. Experience and research along personnel lines, moreover, have resulted in a constant shifting of emphasis and in the development of new methods and techniques. Since personnel administration is concerned with any number of human variables, it is not surprising that personnel policies considered "scientific" at any given time may become obsolete and be discarded for others formulated in the course of experimentation.

Although all books on public administration pay some attention to the various aspects of public personnel administration, limitations of space prevent any extended treatment. As a consequence, the reviewer has felt the need during the past few years of a more extensive and inclusive discussion and restatement of the problem. To him *Public Personnel Administration* by Professors Mosher and Kingsley has met this need. Within the pages of this volume may be found not only sufficient historical discussion to present the function of personnel administration in its proper setting, but also a somewhat detailed and, at times, critical analysis of existing personnel practices and procedures relating to every important problem arising in the field of public personnel administration. A useful annotated bibliography by chapters is included as an appendix.

J. ALTON BURDINE

The University of Texas

#### BOOK NOTES

Walter F. Dodd's *Administration of Workmen's Compensation*, (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1936, pp. xviii, 845) is one in a series of excellent studies in administrative law sponsored by the Legal Research Committee of the Commonwealth Fund, and like the others it is thorough, up-to-date, and interpretative. The difficulties encountered in analysing

various state approaches to a particular problem of this character are obvious, but the author has met them successfully by centering attention upon the major phases of workmen's compensation administration as these affect all jurisdictions and by bringing into the discussion of the more important problems a wealth of information gained from intensive study and field investigation in selected states. The issues involved in this important field of governmental administration are presented clearly, and a somewhat detailed analysis of those practices in the more "progressive" states that have proved reasonably successful are analyzed. Historical material and excerpts from official investigations are used to good effect. There is much valuable information given that presents the challenging problem of judicial *versus* administrative control of administrative action—a problem interesting and familiar to students of public administration. To those interested in governmental administration in general or in administrative law in particular, this book will be valuable and informative.

J. A. B.

Ada Eliot Sheffield in her *Social Insight in Social Situations* (New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1937, pp. xii, 279) appeals for a more scientific basis for social case work, as well as for better organization of the vast amount of material collected by social workers. She suggests that case workers analyze their cases into "need situations" or patterns, so that they will have comparable units of study which will be helpful in determining the causation of problems, and in the evaluation of methods of treatment. She quotes from well selected case records to demonstrate how cases carried over long periods show changing need situations. The results of studies of case material by this method would be a valuable contribution to social science. Mrs. Sheffield thinks that it is regrettable that sociology has not contributed as much to modern case work as psychology and psychiatry. If sociological concepts could be broken down into sub-concepts which correspond to the "situations" with which case workers deal, social workers would be given better insight into social problems. Cooperative research by academic research workers and experienced case workers in private agencies would add to our knowledge of family relationships, and would organize for a useful purpose what social workers learn in their everyday experience. Besides offering a challenge for more analytical thinking by mature case workers, the book has value to beginning students in the field in that it describes social work at its present stage of practice.

M. E. H.

*George Westinghouse* (A Forum presenting the Career and Achievements of George Westinghouse on the 90th Anniversary of His Birth. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers. New York, 1937, pp. 77), a booklet dramatizing the contributions of an outstanding leader in the field of engineering, is divided into two parts. Part One presents the engineering achievements of Westinghouse. Part Two gives a brief picture of the man and his achievements as factors in our modern life. The booklet does not present a critical analysis of George Westinghouse's career, but is intended



to glorify his life and works. This it does well. This is the chief weakness in terms of historical value. He is a good example of "rugged individualism" of the pioneers who built modern industrial America. He came on the scene of American life at an opportune moment and made the most of that opportunity. The book presents intimate glimpses of the man, by men who were associated with him over a long period of years. Their views are naturally colored by that association, nevertheless they make interesting reading. The book closes with a brief evaluation of Westinghouse's achievements as factors in our modern life by President-emeritus James R. Angell of Yale. Westinghouse influenced, profoundly, our transportation and our industrial system. As stated above the booklet accomplishes its purpose but if it had less praise and more critical analysis it would be more valuable to the historian.

G. W. McG.

*The Social Security Act in Operation: A Practical Guide to the Federal and Federal-State Social Security Programs*, (Washington, D. C.: Graphic Arts Press, Inc., 1937, pp. vii, 382.) by Birchard E. Wyatt and William H. Wandel serves the admirable purpose suggested in the subtitle of the book. It is a practical guide to the Federal and Federal-State Social Security programs. This study takes first place as a scholarly book on the principles of the social security act, and experienced administrative skill is evident in the chapters dealing with Federal Old-Age benefits, unemployment compensation, and the public assistance and welfare provisions of the Act. The book serves practical purpose for all who are responsible for administering the Social Security Act, and if it is widely read by business men, lawmakers, newspaper editors, and leaders of opinion there will be an informed understanding of the Social Security Act and its administration. Birchard E. Wyatt is Acting Chief Technical Adviser of the Office of the Actuary on the Social Security Board. William H. Wandel is Senior Technical Adviser of the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation of the Social Security Board. William L. Schurz, who collaborated in the writing of this book, is Chief of Training on the Social Security Board.

C. W. P.

*From Sedan to Stresa* by Victor L. and Marguerite H. Albjerg, (New York: D. van Nostrand Company Inc., 1937. pp. xxii, 1187.) attempts in thirty-four chapters to cover for college students the significant events in European history from 1870 to 1935. Nineteen chapters are devoted to the history of the period from 1870 to 1914, and fifteen chapters span the remaining years. This division indicates that the authors have used good judgment in proportioning the mass of material available to them. The number of maps is adequate. Suggestive reading lists are appended at the close of the chapters. Although the Albjergs do not claim to give more than relatively brief bibliographies, they have often neglected to include some of the more recent books of decided merit. There is too much space allotted to the twelve pages of footnotes at the close of the text—particularly because many of the notes are inconsequential. The subject matter is arranged in the conventional manner, and the style of writing is sufficiently

orthodox to outweigh objections to rather frequent clichés such as to "bait the British lion" (p. 198) "revived the Russian bogey" (p. 199); "came increasingly under a cloud" (p. 984); and "flare for journalism." (p. 998). The Albjergs deserve compliments on their book because they have compiled a logical and readable text in an intricate field.

D. D. J.

*Research Memorandum on Social Aspects of Consumption in the Depression*, (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1937, pp. vii, 86.) by Roland S. Valle with the assistance of Helen G. Conoyer, is another one of the thirteen monographs on the obvious. Anyone, unless it were some Rip Van Winkle, is acquainted with the facts contained therein. As to the technique in research suggested, most any clerk in a research organization is familiar with them. The best thing about this series of monographs is the selected bibliography included at the end of each one. Why the Social Science Research Council wasted money on this series of monographs when there is such a crying need for assistance by many who are trying to do worthwhile pieces of research, it is difficult to understand.

L. L.

*Research Memorandum on Internal Migration in the Depression*, (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1937, pp. vii, 86.) by Warren S. Thompson, is one of a series of thirteen monographs sponsored by the Social Science Research Council "to stimulate the study of depression effects on various social institutions." The sixty-eight pages of text leads to the conclusion that there is, after all, a need for the study of migration and that it would be a fruitful field for research. The writer does not believe, considering the present state of knowledge, that we are ready to adopt a policy with regard to this problem. For those seriously interested in the migration of population some valuable suggestions as to methodology are given. The best thing between the covers is the bibliography.

L. L.

*Problems in Economics*, (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1937, pp. xii, 218.) by William H. Kiekhofer, is a manual to accompany the author's *Economic Principles, Problems, and Policies*. To one who has taught Economics 1a and 1b under Professor Kiekhofer at the University of Wisconsin it is very familiar, and naturally to such an one there is a strong bias in its favor. It is a very teachable manual. It could not be otherwise, having been prepared by that master in the art of organizing economic material.

L. L.

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